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While the formal modern banking system in Nepal commenced in 1937, actual financial 
regulations and supervision of the Nepalese banking industry started only from 1956 when the 
Central bank of Nepal was established. The Nepal Rastra Bank has been gradually embracing 
various international best practices for supervising and regulating its banking industry that is 
suitable for its domestic market need. This project examines the extent to which Nepalese 
commercial banks are embracing the Basel framework of corporate governance principles for 
risk management. To do this, it integrated the Basel frameworks with the legal, regulatory 
framework and relevant prudential rules and regulations that regulate commercial banks of 
Nepal to understand the concept, principles and practices of corporate governance and risk 
management. This project contributes to the literature in the field of corporate governance and 
risk management, particularly in the Nepalese context. It provides a clear and sufficient picture 
of the risk governance practices of the commercial banks of Nepal in terms of their compliance 
with the Rastra Bank’s risk governance requirements and, simultaneously, with their 
implementation of the Basel framework of corporate governance principles of risk 
management. 
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CHAPTER  1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This research project aims to describe and explain the risk management practices of the 
Nepalese commercial banks in relation to the Basel’s corporate governance principles. This 
chapter contextualises the research project by reviewing the research setting, identifying the 
gaps, and defining the objectives of the project. Specifically, Section 1.2 outlines the 
background of this thesis project. Section 1.3 contextualises the study with an overview 
describing Nepal, the Nepalese financial system, and the banking sector of Nepal. Section 1.4 
identifies the gap in research and explains this project’s contribution. Section 1.5 discusses the 
objective of this project and presents the study’s research questions. Section 1.6 provides the 
structure of the remaining chapters in this thesis. Finally, Section 1.7 contains the conclusion 
of Chapter 1. 
1.2 Background 
Risk management in banking is not a new practice, and its importance has been recognised 
ever since banking has existed. However, the topic of risk management has become and 
remained a hot topic after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) (Bessis 2015). One of the 
most significant shocks witnessed in the GFC was that both financial and non-financial 
institutions had weakness in their risk governance mechanisms (Anginer et al. 2019; Dupire 
& Slagmulder 2019; Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2013; Kirkpatrick 2009; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2009). This weakness in risk governance 
led to substantial financial losses and corporate failures, leading to the GFC; since then, there 
has been an increased emphasis on risk management systems and practices. Similarly, countries 
have either introduced or amended their regulations and legislations to improve the corporate 
governances of both their financial and non-financial institutions. 
In response to the crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced a 
new regulatory framework for banks, commonly referred to as Basel III (Apostolik & Donohue 
2015; Boora & Kavita 2018; McCracken et al. 2017; Schmaltz et al. 2014). The Basel III is 
one of the Basel Accords, which have been issued by BCBS. The Basel Accords are 
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international regulatory standards and protocols, specifically designed for the adoption of 
international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision 
(BCP) (Ayadi et al. 2016; Boora & Kavita 2018). The BCBS provides guidelines and 
recommendations for mitigating the risks that are inherent to banking business through the 
Basel Accords (Apostolik, Donohue & Went 2009; Boora & Kavita 2018). Individual 
countries, however, adopt and implement the Basel Accords in ways that are suitable to their 
national law and discretion (Scott & Gelpern 2016). Choudhry (2011) states that an individual 
country’s regulator usually adopts the Basel Accords as the minimum required standards. 
Chapter 2 further discusses the BCBS and the Basel Accords. 
The Central Bank of Nepal, the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) (also known as the Rastra Bank), 
has adopted the best international norms and frameworks (Bank Supervision Department 
2018). For example, according to the Bank Supervision Department (2002), the Rastra Bank 
issued a new set of  NRB regulations 2001, in the form of the Directives. This set of regulations 
was based on the Core Principles of Bank Supervision of the 1988 Basel Accords published by 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Bank Supervision Department 2002). The NRB 
regulations consisted of Directives under seven headings; one of these included corporate 
governance (Bank Supervision Department 2002). This initial corporate governance Directive 
required banks to establish an internal audit committee under the chairpersonship of a non-
executive board member (Bank Supervision Department 2002). The Directives also restricted 
the issuing of loans and advances to promoters of the banks (Bank Supervision Department 
2002). This provision helped to reduce the banks’ non-performing loans and advances (Bank 
Supervision Department 2002). 
In fiscal year (FY) 2016/2017, the Nepal Rastra Bank added a new clause in the Bank and 
Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) regarding the eligibility of the chairperson, board of 
directors or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of banking and financial institutions (BFIs) through 
its Unified Directives. In the Unified Directives FY 2016/2017, the Nepal Rastra Bank also 
barred any elected representatives from becoming the chairperson or board of directors of a 
BFI (MyRepublica 2017). Section 20 of BAFIA 2017 prohibits any elected representatives 
from becoming the chairperson, CEO or board of directors of any BFIs. This new rule 
deliberately blocks members of parliament to take undue advantage by putting pressure on the 
Central Bank through their political influence (MyRepublica 2017). In January 2017, 
parliament approved amendments to BAFIA to reinforce the corporate governance of Nepalese 
commercial banks (International Monetary Fund  2017). 
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This regulatory initiative of the Rastra Bank intends to strengthen the corporate governance 
practices further in the Nepalese banking sector (MyRepublica 2017). 
The NRB has thus gradually initiated the adoption of international best practices in the 
Nepalese banking industry to enhance the corporate governance mechanism and manage the 
risks. However, despite these initiatives by the Rastra Bank, the Nepalese financial system still 
has a weak corporate governance system and inadequate risk management practices (Bank 
Supervision Department 2015; Bhattarai 2014; Nepal Rastra Bank 2017; Ozaki 2014). 
According to the Bank Supervision Department (2019), in the commercial banks of Nepal, the 
board and senior management’s risk oversight function are weak. Initiatives to develop and 
promote a risk management culture in banks is still inadequate (Bank Supervision Department 
2019). Within this context, an exploration of the risk governance mechanism of the Basel 
Accords – in particular, why, how and which Basel Standards have been adopted in the 
Nepalese financial system – will help to gain an in-depth understanding of the risk management 
practices of commercial banks in Nepal. 
1.3 Overview of the Study 
This section discusses the context of the study, by briefly describing Nepal, its financial system 
and the banking industry. 
1.3.1 Brief Introduction of Nepal 
Nepal is a developing economy in South Asia, landlocked between China and India. After the 
Constituent Assembly of Nepal declared Nepal to be a Federal Democratic Republic Country 
on 28 May 2008, Nepal promulgated a new constitution on 20 September 2015. Nepal has 
observed seven constitutions in the last 70 years (Shrestha 2019) and has experienced historic 
democracy movements since the late 1970s (Ozaki 2014). For instance, the People’s Movement 
of the 1990s established democratic reforms in the country’s politics by ending absolute 
monarchy (World Bank 2019b). On 9 November 1990, the King revoked the constitution of 
1962 and ended 30 years of absolute monarchy in politics (Ozaki 2014). However, in February 
1996, the Maoist Party launched an armed rebellion against the constitutional monarchy and 
elected government (Luintel, Selim & Bajracharya 2014; Ozaki 2014; Shrestha 2019; World 
Bank 2019b). This decade-long, Maoist insurgency in the country ended only in 2005 after 
peaceful dialogues were initiated between the Maoist and other major political parties in 2002 
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(Luintel, Selim & Bajracharya 2014). These various people’s and political movements in Nepal 
illustrate that Nepal had undergone a lengthy and complicated transition to federalism (World 
Bank 2018); also, that the country has faced political instability throughout its history. 
As of 2018, Nepal’s population was 29.30 million (World Bank 2019a). Nepal’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) was US Dollar (USD) 29.04 billion in 2018 (World Bank 2019c). The country’s 
primary economic activities, including services, manufacturing and agriculture, contributed 
Nepalese Rupee (NPR) 131,079 million, NPR 56,018 million and NPR 267,458 million, 
respectively, to the nation’s GDP in 2018 (World Bank 2019c). Nepal has also achieved robust 
economic growth of 7.1% in 2019 (World Bank 2019b). However, Nepal relies heavily on 
remittances (Shrestha 2019; World Bank 2018). In 2019, it received USD 7.8 billion in personal 
remittances, which accounted for about 27.989% of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2019c). 
The World Bank (2018) further states that, while foreign direct investment (FDI) accounts for 
only 0.6% of GDP, it grew strongly by 32% year-to-year in FY 2018. This all-time high 
contribution by the economic sectors and growth in FDI in 2018 signal that both the country’s 
economic situation and international investors’ appetite in Nepal are improving. 
1.3.2 Overview of the Nepalese Financial Sector 
Compared to other economies, the Nepalese financial system is unique. The Nepalese financial 
system comprises both banking and non-banking financial institutions (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018). In particular, the BFIs of Nepal constitute commercial banks, development 
banks, finance companies and microfinance institutions (Bank Supervision Department 2018). 
Non-banking financial institutions comprise insurance companies, securities markets, 
contractual saving institutions, and financial non-government organisations (FINGOs) and 
cooperatives that carry out limited banking activities and other services (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018). Appendix 1-1 shows the total number of banking and non-banking financial 
institutions operating in Nepal, as of mid-July 2018. Figure 1-1 shows the structure of Nepal’s 
financial system. Different regulators, which regulate the banking and non-banking financial 
institutions (Bank Supervision Department 2018), are discussed in Chapters 2 and 4. 
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Figure 1-1: Structure of Assets Holding in the Financial System in Nepal 
Source: Nepal Rastra Bank (2018) 
Apart from differences in the type and structure of banking and non-banking financial 
institutions operating in Nepal, the Nepalese financial system has some other distinct 
characteristics. For instance, its financial system has inherent limitations, such as limiting credit 
rating practices (Nepal Rastra Bank 2013, 2018). This limitation of credit rating practices is 
one of the constraints in the implementation of Basel III in the Nepalese banking sector because 
the institutionalisation of credit rating agencies has been essential for implementing Basel III 
(Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). The Nepalese financial system is also not highly integrated with the 
global financial system (Uprety 2013). In other words, the Nepalese financial system has 
relatively low, or no, exposure to international financial markets (Nepal Rastra Bank 2012). It 
neither has access to international exchanges of local stocks, nor the listing of foreign stocks 
in local exchanges (Risal & Panta 2019). Likewise, Nepal’s money and capital markets are still 
in their infancy (Sharma 2014). When compared with other economies, the Nepalese banking 
industry has yet not achieved the level of development and advancement of the international 
standards ( Nepal Rastra Bank 2013, p. 16), and the products and services offered by the 
Nepalese banking industry are still mostly conventional (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). 
However, these scenarios are changing gradually, especially after Nepal has allowed 
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Rastra Bank 2010, 2015a). More importantly, the Rastra Bank’s provision has expanded the 
BFIs’ scope of operations. The Rastra Bank has expanded the sources of funding for BFIs 
(Nepal Rastra Bank 2018), both in term of foreign borrowing and deposits (Nepal Rastra Bank 
2019). As seen in Appendix 1-1, the Nepalese financial system now has two credit rating 
agencies. The banking industry in Nepal has become more complex with the development of 
new products and the adoption of advanced information and communication technology (ICT) 
(Bank Supervision Department 2019). For instance, with the advancement and adoption of 
technology, more people are using ATM cards, and mobile and internet-based banking services 
to execute financial transactions (Bank Supervision Department 2019). From this increasing 
scope of operations of BFIs, it promptly follows that the financial system is becoming more 
complex. The changes in the Nepalese financial system also reflect that it is integrating with 
other financial systems globally. 
1.3.3 Overview of the Nepalese Banking Industry 
Various forces, such as financial sector reforms (FSRs), domestic and international economies, 
and technology, have transformed the Nepalese financial sector. The financial liberalisation 
policy adopted in the mid-1980s, in particular, brought significant changes to the banking 
system of Nepal. Luintel, Selim and Bajracharya (2014) confirm that, until 1984, there 
were only two commercial banks in Nepal. However, with the implementation of financial 
liberalisation policy, many foreign joint-venture banks and private banks were established in 
the financial market of Nepal (Bank Supervision Department 2019; Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). 
Luintel, Selim and Bajracharya (2014) agree that the Nepalese commercial banking 
segment transformed quickly and deeply after 2002, particularly after the second phase 
of FSRs. This second phase of reform fully opened the financial sector to the private 
sector, for both domestic and international investors (Luintel, Selim & Bajracharya 
2014). The banking system changed significantly, both in terms of the number and structure 
of its institutions (Luintel, Selim & Bajracharya 2014; Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). In 2011, 
the number of BFIs reached a peak of 218, from just 3 in 1985 (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). Panta 
and Bedari (2015) confirmed that despite Maoist insurgency and political instability in the 
country, the banking industry had shown the growth. However, this growth in the number of 
BFIs stopped in 2012, after the NRB adopted a moratorium on licensing new BFIs in 2011 
(Nepal Rastra Bank 2014). Figure 1-2, below, reflects the change in the number of BFIs. 
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Currently, the Nepalese banking system is undergoing a restructuring and consolidation 
process, mainly through the moratorium on licensing new BFIs (except for microfinance 
institutions), the adaptation of policy on mergers and acquisitions, and increase in the paid-up 
capital requirements (Bank Supervision Department 2019; Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). The NRB 
has increased the minimum in paid-up capital to promote financial stability, as well as to 
mobilise the resources required for the nation’s long-term development (Nepal Rastra Bank 
2015b). For example, the Rastra Bank has increased the regulatory capital requirement of all 
BFIs, including commercial banks, through its monetary policy FY 2015/2016 (Nepal Rastra 
Bank 2015b). The minimum paid-up capital requirement, as presented in Appendix 1-2, shows 
the newly updated paid-up capital of all BFIs. Likewise, the number of BFIs are also decreasing 
in Nepal because the BFIs are consolidating through the process of merger and acquisition. 
Figure 1-2 shows the change in the number of financial institutions under NRB jurisdictions 
from 1985 to 2018. The following section discusses the nature and structure of BFIs of Nepal. 
 
Figure 1-2: Number of Financial Institutions under NRB Jurisdictions 1985–2018 
Source: Nepal Rastra Bank (2018) 
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The Rastra Bank classification that regulates BFIs in Nepal is based on their capital base, 
geographical coverage and operations (BAFIA 2017; Uprety 2013). There are four categories 
of BFIs in Nepal: class ‘A’ recognised as commercial banks, class ‘B’ known as development 
banks, class ‘C’ identified as finance companies, and class ‘D’ known as microfinance 
institutions (BAFIA 2017; Uprety 2013). Appendixes 1-1 and 1-3, show the different types of 
banks and financial institutions operating in Nepal. With respect to the BFIs’ operations, as per 
the Nepal Rastra Bank Act 2002, class ‘A’ institutions are permitted to conduct a wide range 
of banking and financial services, such as corporate lending through consortium financing and 
conducting all types of foreign exchange operations. Development banks, however, are not 
allowed to engage in corporate lending through consortium financing; they are restricted to 
some foreign exchange operations such as letter of credit (LC) transactions and bills of 
exchange (BAFIA 2017; Uprety 2013). In the Nepalese financial market, therefore, 
commercial banks are usually more complex than other types of financial institutions, such as 
development banks and finance companies (Bank Supervision Department 2018). 
As stated above in the Appendixes and figure, while there are several players in the Nepalese 
financial system, commercial banks are usually larger and more complex than the other BFIs 
(Bank Supervision Department 2018). Chapter 3 further explains the categories of Nepalese 
commercial banks. A list of commercial banks operating in Nepal is also presented in Appendix 
1-3. Apart from the minimum paid-up capital requirement, geographical coverage and 
operational function, Nepalese commercial banks are also dominant in terms of their assets 
holdings. For example, in the Nepalese financial system, commercial banks occupy 83.41% in 
terms of the total assets and liabilities of NRB regulated BFIs (Bank Supervision Department 
2018). This dominance of commercial banks can reveal that commercial banks in Nepal are 
the most important player of the Nepalese financial industry, exerting a significant role in the 
country’s economy and development. The failure of even a single class ‘A’ bank could have a 
contagious effect on not just the entire Nepalese financial system but the whole economy (Bank 
Supervision Department 2018).  
The above overview of Nepal’s financial system clearly shows that the system’s participation 
and integration into the global financial market has been growing in recent years. This 
expansion of the domestic financial system across national borders, however, has not only 
opened and broadened the opportunities for the Nepalese domestic financial market but has 
also increased its risk exposures to the global financial market. In other words, the risks of the 
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Nepalese financial system, which had been relatively confined to national boundaries (Nepal 
Rastra Bank 2018), is now directly exposed to global financial markets. 
1.4 Research Gap and Contribution 
The importance and scope of corporate governance are increasing. McNulty, Zattoni and 
Douglas (2013) claim that, since the 1990s, the number of qualitative studies in the field of 
governance has grown. There is, however, still only a limited number of published qualitative 
studies on governance (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013; Zattoni, Douglas & Judge 2013). 
Yasin, Muhamad and Sulaiman (2014) confirm that qualitative research in the field of 
corporate governance is understudied, despite there being diverse and extensive quantitative 
literature available. Bansal (2013) views that, in the corporate governance field, research tilts 
heavily in the quantitative direction. Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), and Dupire and 
Slagmulder (2019) also claim that, despite the importance of risk governance in the financial 
sector, this topic has been little explored in the academic field. According to McNulty, Zattoni 
and Douglas (2013), there is a need and scope for qualitative research across different contexts 
and levels of analysis that explores corporate governance. Thus, there is much scope and need 
for qualitative research studies in this field (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013; Yasin, 
Muhamad & Sulaiman 2014; Zattoni, Douglas & Judge 2013). 
In particular, Zattoni, Douglas and Judge (2013) have encouraged governance scholars to 
conduct qualitative governance studies from non-European countries, because prior research 
on governance was mostly based on the United Kingdom (UK) and European countries 
(McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013; Zattoni, Douglas & Judge 2013). McNulty, Zattoni and 
Douglas (2013) found that four studies have been conducted in the United States of America 
(USA), one in Canada, three in China, two in the Middle East and one in Africa. The findings 
from the study of McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) indicate that qualitative governance 
studies have not been much explored in other research settings. Yusof (2016) agrees that 
prior studies in corporate governance have mirrored the US and UK contexts. In the 
Nepalese context, specifically, there have been limited research studies conducted in the areas 
of governance. For instance, Sharma (2014) claims that there have been no studies conducted 
in the Nepalese context in the area of corporate governance disclosures. Similarly, Acharya 
(2018) claims that very few studies have been conducted in Nepalese corporate governance 
and firm performance. From the above argument, it follows that there is both need and scope 
for qualitative corporate governance studies in the Nepalese context. Therefore, in investigating 
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the risk governance of the Nepalese commercial banks, this project aims to contribute broadly 
into two aspects. 
First, as discussed earlier, this project adds to the existing literature because the topic of 
corporate governance has been less explored and studied in the Nepalese context. This project 
thus contributes to the extant risk management and corporate governance literature within the 
context of the Nepalese banking industry. Because this project studies the risk management 
practices of the Nepalese banking industry in relation to the Basel’s corporate governance 
accords, this study can help stakeholders – such as researchers, investors, bank employees, 
customers and shareholders – understand the implementation of the Basel Accords in the 
Nepalese banking industry, especially the corporate governance mechanism for risk 
management. 
Second, the findings from this project can contribute to policy debates. McNulty, Zattoni and 
Douglas (2013), and Zattoni, Douglas and Judge (2013) view that qualitative research is 
suitable to better understand and rethink corporate governance, as well as to assist 
policymakers and practitioners in formulating better governance mechanisms. To be precise, 
this study’s results can indicate the need to call for policy actions. For example, stakeholders 
such as individual banks, banking associations, regulators and policymakers can call for actions 
to amend or improve policies and regulations, which will further strengthen the risk governance 
practices of Nepalese commercial banks. 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
This project’s primary purpose is to contribute to knowledge in the field of corporate 
governance for the Nepalese banking system by exploring and describing the risk management 
practices of the Nepalese commercial banks in particular. This project has not analysed the 
relationship between banking regulations and supervision on the banks’ risk governance 
mechanisms. Similarly, this project has not examined the impact of banking regulations and 
supervision on the banks’ risk governance mechanism. To achieve this project’s objectives, the 
following research questions have been formulated. 
Research Question 1: 
How has the NRB implementation of the Basel’s core principles helped the Nepalese 
commercial industry to progress its risk governance practices, precisely, the risk committee at 
board level and the CRO at the senior management level? 
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Research Question 2: 
Have Nepalese commercial banks complied with the risk governance structure mandates 
required by the Rastra Bank, precisely, for the risk committees at board level and the CRO at 
senior management level? 
To achieve these objectives, two steps of analysis have been undertaken, which are explained 
in Chapter 3. 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 comprises a relevant literature 
review, which discusses risk and risk management–related corporate governance mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 describes and discusses the data and methodology employed in this project. Chapter 
4 presents and discusses the results, and Chapter 5 presents the study’s conclusions. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter started with an introduction that discussed the importance of risk management and 
its regulation in the banking industry. To contextualise this project, it gave a brief summary of 
Nepal and the Nepalese financial system. Chapter 1 also highlighted how this study can 
contribute to the extant literatures in the risk governance field to gain a better understanding of 
the risk governance mechanism in the Nepalese banking industry. This chapter also established 
the nature and structure of this study. The following chapter provides definitions for the key 
terms associated with risk governance, and it reviews the literature on the corporate governance 
mechanism for risk management.
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CHAPTER  2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In banking, the importance of risk governance has been increasing. Banking regulators are 
revising their risk management regulations and standards in an attempt to enhance the resilience 
of the risk management system. Within this context, the chapter provides definitions for the 
key terms associated with risk governance, and it reviews the literature on the corporate 
governance mechanism for risk management. This chapter also discusses the rationale for 
applying the theoretical approach taken in this study to answer the research questions identified 
in Chapter 1. This chapter contains 13 sections. The first six sections discuss several key 
concepts in risk governance, while the remaining sections review the literature relevant to this 
project. In particular, Section 2.2 provides an overview of banking; Section 2.3 explains the 
meaning and type of risk in banking, and Section 2.4 describes risk management and its 
importance on banking. Section 2.5 introduces the regulation of banks regarding risk 
management and further explains why regulations are essential in the banking sector. Section 
2.6 explains the relationship between risk governance and the GFC. Section 2.7 provides a 
discussion of both the international and national regulations that guide risk governance in 
banking. Section 2.8 discusses the scope of risk governance. Section 2.9 shows what risk 
governance elements were investigated in the previous studies of risk governance. Section 2.10 
gives a synopsis of some of the risk governance shortcomings of the Nepalese banking industry. 
Section 2.11 provides the rationale for choosing the agency and public interest theories to 
understand the risk governance mechanism of the Nepalese commercial banks. Section 2.12 
summarises the literature to relate them with this project’s research questions. Finally, Section 
2.13 provides a review of this chapter. 
2.2 Overview of Banking 
In any country, banks are an essential industry, which offers a diverse range of financial 
services to their customers. Apostolik, Donohue and Went (2009) note that banks and banking 
have in existence for a long time. Traditionally, banks have offered core banking functions 
such as collecting deposits, underwriting loans and managing payment services (Apostolik, 
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Donohue & Went 2009). For example, banks act as an intermediary to mobilise funds between 
savers and borrowers (Das 2016) and to invest short-term liabilities in risky longer-term assets 
(Khalid & Hanif 2005). Similarly, banks deliver essential services to individuals, industries 
and governments (Keefe & Pfleiderer 2012) to finance their consumption, investment and 
capital expenditure need, respectively (Ozili & Outa 2017; Schwert 2018). By providing a 
financing source to businesses and consumers, banks play a critical role in facilitating the 
economic activities and economic development of a country. 
In addition to these services, banks manage the transfer and payment of funds between parties, 
both locally and internationally (Apostolik, Donohue & Went 2009). Banks also facilitate 
economic activities through financial intermediation, assets transformation and money creation 
(Apostolik, Donohue & Went 2009). However, as banking evolves, the traditional functions of 
banks are extending. Choudhry (2011) views that the scope of the banking business is 
expanding in modern days. For instance, banks engage in a wide range of activities, from 
essential corporate lending to complex transactions such as securitisation and hybrid product 
trading (Choudhry 2011). Banks also now provide other financial services such as LCs, 
derivatives services and securitisation (Apostolik, Donohue & Went 2009). Each of these 
banking activities, however, generates more than one type of risk (Ghosh 2012). Thus, banks 
are specialised institutions that are engaged heavily in capitalist activities (Bhattacharya 2010; 
Watkins 2011) where these banking activities carry risks (Bhattacharya 2010; Ghosh 2012). 
2.3 Definition of Risk and Types of Risk in Banking 
The above overview of banking outlined that, in all banking activities, risks are inevitable. 
Because risks are omnipresent in banking, the following section explains the meaning and types 
of risk in banking. 
2.3.1 Meaning of Risk in Banking 
There are multiple definitions for risk (Apostolik, Donohue & Went 2009; Bessis 2011, 2015). 
The meaning of risk changes, depending on the context and its interpretation (Laycock 2014). 
The critical question is, therefore, how is risk defined in BFIs? Bessis (2011, 2015) defines 
risks in finance as the randomness of return on investment that includes both positive and 
negative outcome. In this sense, risks are related to the uncertainty and volatility of future 
outcomes. In the financial industry, however, risk is defined as uncertainty that can have 
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adverse consequences in the earnings or wealth of banks (Bessis 2011, 2015). In short, risk is 
‘the uncertainty of loss’ (Onyiriuba 2016), and it has two main characteristics: uncertainty and 
loss (Onyiriuba 2016). 
2.3.2 Types of Risk in Banking 
All businesses, irrespective of their sector, face one kind of risk or another in their day-to-day 
operations. According to Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014), non-financial institutions face 
traditional risks due to factors such as the entrance of new competitors, change in technologies, 
and weaknesses in supply chains. However, compared to non-financial institutions, BFIs are 
more exposed to different types of risks. Bhattacharya (2010) states that banks face both 
financial and non-financial risks. According to Ghosh (2012), while financial risks directly 
cause losses to the financial position of BFIs, non-financial risks affect their financial 
conditions indirectly. According to Bessis (2011), financial risks in BFIs can be differentiated 
as per the sources of losses, such as default on payment obligations by borrowers, internal fraud 
by staff and market movements. Thus, the broad types of inevitable financial risks in banking 
are credit, operational and market risks (Ghosh 2012). Likewise, the broad types of non-
financial risks in banking are reputational, technology and legal risks. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
different types of risks in banking, which are inevitable because of their business nature. 
  
 




Figure 2-1: Types of Risks in Banking 
Source: Ghosh (2012) 
2.4 Overview of Risk Management in Banking and Its Importance 
The above sections gave an overview of banking and risk, as well as the types of risks that 
banks face, and explained that banking is the risky business of money (Docherty & Viort 2014). 
They also explained that these risks are not only inevitable but also highly interconnected 
(Bhattacharya 2010; Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014). Thus, risk management is a crucial function 
in banking. The following section describes the meaning and goal of risk management in 
banking and explains why risk management is crucial in banking. 
2.4.1 Definition of Risk Management in Banking 
Because risk management is a crucial function in banking, it is necessary to understand how 






Operating Environment Risk, 
Reputation Risk, Legal Risk, 
Money laundering Risk, 
Technology Risk, Strategy Risk 






Chapter Two – Literature Review   16 
 
management is the process of proactively selecting the type and level of risks that are 
appropriate for firms. This process includes the development of tools and techniques to identify 
and measure the risk, and to establish procedures and systems to manage those identified risks 
(Ghosh 2012). Robust risk management should define who is accountable for what risks and 
how risk processes are implemented (Bessis 2015). Risk management and risk-taking, 
therefore, are two sides of the same coin (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014). Further, in banking, 
risk management does not avoid or eliminate risks; rather, it handles them appropriately to 
minimise losses that might incur (Ghosh 2012). In short, risk management is the process where 
the risks to BFIs are identified, assessed and controlled (Bessis 2015) to optimise the risk-
adjusted returns on assets (Ghosh 2012). Risk management in firms consists of the following 
steps, as shown in Figure 2.2, below. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Risk Management Process 
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Source: Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014, p. 2) 
The above arguments about the definition of risk management showed that risk management 
has several goals. For instance, Bhattacharya (2010) states that one of the essential goals of 
risk management is to balance the optimal level of trade-off between risk and reward. Jimmy 
and Chen (2015) claim that, in banking, one of the goals of risk management is to find an 
efficient way to mitigate risk so that banks can have a tolerable risk profile. The main objective 
of risk management is to ensure the solvency of the banking entity, including its subsidiary 
groups (Ghosh 2012). In short, the main objective of risk management in banking is to balance 
the risks and returns of the banks, supporting the stability of the entire financial system and 
economy at large. 
2.4.2 Importance of Risk Management in Banking 
Risk management in banking is essential for several reasons. First, banks face a conflict of 
interest from multiple stakeholders. In the previous section’s overview of banking, banks were 
found to have multiple stakeholders and exert significant impact to these stakeholders. 
However, these stakeholders also have their own interests in the banks. For instance, depositors 
want their deposit to be secured and readily available for withdrawal (Ghosh 2012). Likewise, 
shareholders demand a market return on their capital, and regulators strive for stability in the 
financial system and economy at large (Ghosh 2012). In this sense, BFIs such as banks are 
confronted simultaneously with the conflicting interest of stakeholders (Bessis 2015; John, De 
Masi & Paci 2016). For instance, banks are responsible for safeguarding the rights of their 
depositors; assuring the stability of the payment system; and, more importantly, reducing 
systemic risks (Andres & Vallelado 2008). 
Second, BFIs such as banks are subject to the problem of moral hazard (Bessis 2015). Banks 
face the issue of moral hazard because they deal with the public’s money (Haan & Vlahu 2016; 
Oates & Dias 2016). Moral hazard arises when the risk-taking party is more willing to take a 
risk because the cost of taking such risk will be borne by others (Bessis 2015). The primary 
obligation of banks is to create value for their shareholders, just like any other corporate firm 
(Jimmy & Chen 2015). Therefore, banks might not hesitate in taking excessive risks to fulfil 
this primary objective (Bhattacharya 2010). In other words, because BFIs deal with the public’s 
money, there are both tendencies and opportunities to gain at the cost of depositors, especially 
by taking excessive risks (Haan & Vlahu 2016; Oates & Dias 2016). 
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The third reason for emphasising the importance of risk management in banking is because the 
failure of banks carries systemic risk (Apostolik & Donohue 2015). A bank failure, either 
partially or entirely, can have an adverse impact on the entire economy (Apostolik & Donohue 
2015). In particular, a run on a bank can have an adversarial effect on the stability of the entire 
financial system and global economy at large (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014; Haan & Vlahu 
2016; John, De Masi & Paci 2016). The failure of an individual bank not only harms its 
shareholders but also its depositors and other debtholders (Haan & Vlahu 2016; John, De Masi 
& Paci 2016). Thus, it is necessary for BFIs to protect depositors’ interest and maintain 
financial stability because their failures can have severe adverse consequences in the economy 
(Bhattacharya 2010; Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014; Jimmy & Chen 2015). Thus, the above 
discussions make clear why risk management is essential in the financial industry. 
2.5 Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
Most often, risk management interlinks with corporate governance. To illustrate this idea, the 
topic of corporate governance and risk management is highlighted whenever there are news 
stories about corporate scandals, corporate failures or financial crises (Abdullah 2014). The 
following section defines corporate governance and discusses its relationship with risk 
management. 
2.5.1 Meaning of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is multidisciplinary and multidimensional. The meaning and scope of 
corporate governance differ, according to the discipline and perspective from which it is 
viewed (Turnbull 1997; Yusof 2016). According to some, the definition of corporate 
governance is ambiguous and is influenced by theories originating from different academic 
disciplines (Padgett 2012; Turnbull 1997; Yusof 2016). According to Tricker (2019), the idea 
and practice of corporate governance are ancient and as old as trade itself. Du Plessis et al. 
(2015) claim, however, that early attempts to define the term ‘corporate governance’ can be 
found in the UK’s Cadbury Report 1992. Tricker (2019) claims that the Cadbury Report 1992 
became a pioneer standard-setter for corporate governance, even though the report solely aimed 
to improve corporate governance in Britain (Hemraj 2002). While companies in the UK were 
never forced to comply with the Cadbury Report’s codes, companies were obliged to explain 
to their shareholders why they diverged from the codes (Padgett 2012). The Cadbury Report 
1992 is still acknowledged as the starting point for how companies should be managed (Du 
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Plessis et al. 2015). Since 1999, scholars broadly recognise OECD principles as a point of 
reference for developing corporate governance codes and practices (Bota-Avram & Rachisan 
2013). 
Tricker (2019) mentions that, according to the Cadbury Report 1992, corporate governance is 
defined as a system by which corporations are directed and controlled. According to Tricker 
(2019), the Cadbury Report explained that the board of directors should be responsible for the 
governance of their companies through corporate governance codes. More importantly, Tricker 
(2019) claims that the Cadbury Report also called for establishing an appropriate governance 
structure. The main aspects of corporate governance covered in the Cadbury Report 1992 
included the board’s responsibilities, their qualifications and audit committee (Hemraj 2002; 
Padgett 2012). Governance encompasses rules, processes and regulations that guide decision-
making processes on a company’s strategies and operations (Crittenden & Crittenden 2012). 
Thus, according to Tricker (2019), corporate governance is a mechanism of exercising power 
to ensure that corporate entities are managed effectively and efficiently in the right direction. 
In other words, the board is accountable for an organisation’s decisions, behaviours and 
performances. 
Du Plessis et al. (2015), however, view that the above definition of corporate governance is not 
sufficient or helpful with the addition of further strands of corporate governance. Further, Du 
Plessis et al. (2015) argue that corporate governance is a system of regulating and supervising 
the activities of corporate entities to balance the interests of all stakeholders to ensure a 
company’s long-term sustainable growth. According to the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2015), corporate governance is a set of relationships between a company and its 
stakeholders, which provides the structure and means for achieving and monitoring the 
company’s objectives. García‐Sánchez and García‐Meca (2018) also view that corporate 
governance provides the mechanism for setting a firm’s structure to achieve objectives 
that serve the interests of both shareholders and the wider community. Ultimately, 
corporate governance is a mechanism aimed at improving a firm’s economic efficiency, 
supporting the company’s growth and boosting investors’ confidence (García‐Sánchez 
& García‐Meca 2018). 
Based on the above definitions, corporate governance involves aligning the interests of a 
company’s stakeholders to reduce inefficiencies that arise from moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Conversely, corporate governance requires establishing a mechanism to monitor the 
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policies, decisions and actions of companies. Tricker (2019) argues, however, that corporate 
governance ideas, concepts and practices are evolving continually. From this evolving nature 
of corporate governance, it promptly follows that the definition of corporate governance will 
adjust accordingly to new challenges and insights (Du Plessis et al. 2015). 
2.5.2 Relationship between Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
Corporate governance and risk management are highly related. Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014) 
claim that it is difficult to distinguish clearly between risk management and corporate 
governance. From the view of corporate governance, the board’s primary responsibility is to 
manage conflict of interest between stakeholders to boost returns, while assuming the risks and 
longer-term interests of all stakeholders in the company (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014). Khalid 
and Hanif (2005) state that strong corporate governance is the means for empowering banks’ 
management to identify proactively, measure, monitor, and control the risk. Therefore, from 
the Sections 2.3.1 ‘meaning of risk management’ and 2.5.2 ‘corporate governance’, it promptly 
follows that the principles of both risk management and corporate governance are to increase 
the competitiveness of the organisations.  
Many scholars have also discussed the importance of corporate governance as a means of risk 
management tool. Choi (2013) states that risk governance provides the framework to define 
which risks should be managed; who should be held accountable for managing a particular 
risk; and how should these risks be managed for creating shareholders’ wealth, without risking 
the firm. Chen and Lin (2016) agree that corporate governance can help to manage and reduce 
banking risks. Similarly, according to Stulz (2016), good governance means that a bank has a 
mechanism that supports the board and management to choose the right amount of risk for its 
shareholders, which maximises their wealth. In short, all these arguments have illustrated that 
risk management and corporate governance are interrelated. The terms corporate governance 
and risk governance, therefore, are used interchangeably in this project. 
Corporate governance is thus a set of relationships between a company and its stakeholders, 
which provides the structure and means for achieving and monitoring the company’s objectives 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). These arguments explain how strong 
corporate governance is the means for empowering a bank’s management to identify, measure, 
monitor and control risk proactively (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). 
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2.6 Risk Governance and the Global Financial Crisis 
As mentioned earlier, corporate governance is evolving continually to incorporate new 
challenges and insights. For instance, to address flaws that were revealed during the GFC, 
the Basel Committee issued the Basel III (Anginer et al. 2019; Apostolik & Donohue 
2015; McCracken et al. 2017). Tricker (2019) claims that the GFC caused some new 
components in corporate governance policies and practices to be added. 
International standard-setting bodies and governance scholars have examined how risk 
governance could impact the ability of a bank to measure and manage risks for the bank’s 
success. For example, the  OECD (2009) states that one of the greatest shocks revealed by the 
GFC was widespread risk management failure across both financial and non-financial 
corporations. The OECD (2009) found that, in several events, the boards of corporations were 
ignorant of the risks to which the companies were exposed. According to the FSB (2013), 
corporations did not understand the risks to which they were exposed and that they were 
undertaking. The FSB (2013) also claims that directors had not given enough attention and 
time to set-up effective risk management structures, such as establishing a dedicated risk 
management committee (RMC). 
In addition to the international standard-setting agencies mentioned above, several governance 
scholars have examined and revealed that weakness in risk governance was one of the main 
causes for the GFC of 2008. Kirkpatrick (2009) attributed the cause of the financial crisis to 
weakness in corporate governance, especially, failure to safeguard excessive risk-taking 
behaviours in financial corporations. Mongiardino and Plath (2010) argue that the failure of 
board members to oversee risks properly was one of the factors that contributed to the financial 
crisis. Murphy (2011) also claims that past crises and potential future failures of financial 
institutions can be attributed to risk management, which is linked to the mechanism of 
corporate governance. Abdullah (2014) points out that the enormous losses and corporate 
failures observed in recent years were due to excessive risk-taking by management. Dupire and 
Slagmulder (2019) also state that weaknesses in the governance and risk management functions 
of banks triggered the financial crisis. In short, especially after the financial crisis, corporate 
scandals that arise from practices, such as accounting frauds and lack of board accountability, 
have gained renewed interest in corporate governance regulations and practices. 
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2.7 Regulations in Banking for Risk Management 
In one way or another, every industry is regulated and controlled. Tricker (2019) views that all 
corporate organisations, whether private or public, profit- or nonprofit-oriented, must be 
governed by a governing body. Tricker (2019) further claims that, by enacting legislation, 
governments provide the mechanisms for facilitating, regulating and constraining the activities 
of corporations registered under their jurisdictions. However, compared to other sectors, the 
financial industry is the most heavily regulated industry (Docherty & Viort 2014; McCracken 
et al. 2017). Banking activities are subject to an extensive body of rules (Bessis 2015), and a 
range of regulations and controls (Choudhry 2011). More importantly, BFIs are subject to strict 
compliance for numerous government regulatory regimes (Apostolik, Donohue & Went 2009; 
Docherty & Viort 2014; McCracken et al. 2017). Some examples of banking regulations are 
the minimum regulatory requirement of a bank’s capital; compliance to features of corporate 
banking governance, such as board composition; and the qualifications and skills posed by the 
board of directors (John, De Masi & Paci 2016). The banking and financial regulators can 
impose similar types of regulations to those mentioned above for enhancing supervision and 
fostering financial stability (John, De Masi & Paci 2016). 
All governments regulate the banking industry (Apostolik & Donohue 2015). They do so for 
various reasons. According to Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014), there are mostly two reasons 
why regulators impose and monitor risk management standards. First, banks collect deposits 
from the public, and second, banks play a critical role in managing payments and facilitating 
the credit system (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014). The chief concern for all stakeholders, 
including bank regulators and authorities in charge of managing the economy, is to avoid a 
bank run (Apostolik & Donohue 2015). The regulators want to ensure that each bank operates 
fairly, responsibly and prudently (Apostolik & Donohue 2015; Jimmy & Chen 2015). They 
also want to ensure that the entire banking system remains stable (Jimmy & Chen 2015). As 
such, regulators closely monitor the activities of banks and require strict compliance from them 
for regulations such as minimum regulatory capital adequacy. One of the crucial purposes of 
bank regulation, in this sense, is to ensure that a bank keeps enough capital for the risks it takes 
(Hull 2012). From the above discussion, banking regulations can be understood as the most 
effective means of preventing systemic risks (Bessis 2015), by protecting depositors’ interests 
and promoting the financial system’s stability (John, De Masi & Paci 2016). 
 
Chapter Two – Literature Review   23 
 
2.7.1 International Risk Management Framework for BFIs 
Until 1988, banking regulation differed widely among countries, because different 
governments and regulatory bodies developed banking rules and supervisory guidelines that 
meet their own country’s specific needs (Apostolik & Donohue 2015; Uprety 2013). The GFC, 
however, has illustrated that there is a need for an international approach to address specific 
types of regulatory problems. To illustrate, McCracken et al. (2017) view that system risks 
cannot be addressed through national regulations alone. Thus, international collaborations and 
frameworks are essential. The types of literature on the Basel are vast and complex (Docherty 
& Viort 2014). The following section briefly discusses the BIS, BCBS and Basel Accords, as 
related to risk management. 
2.7.1.1 Bank for International Settlements and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
McCracken et al. (2017) state that international bodies are essential in financial regulations. 
Various international bodies are involved in creating international financial regulations. For 
instance, G-20 and FSB are seen as agenda-setting bodies (McCracken et al. 2017). Similarly, 
the BCBS and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) are considered 
as standard-setting bodies (McCracken et al. 2017). In 1930, central banks of G-10 set up the 
BIS based in Basel, Switzerland (Docherty & Viort 2014; McCracken et al. 2017; Scott & 
Gelpern 2016). Also referred to as the Basel, the BIS is the principal centre of cooperation for 
international central banks (Apostolik & Donohue 2015); (Docherty & Viort 2014; McCracken 
et al. 2017). The BIS fosters cooperation among central banks and other government 
authorities, which work in pursuit of monetary and financial stability (Pelzer 2013). 
The BCBS, commonly referred to as the Basel Committee, functions under the supervision of 
the BIS (Boora and Kavita 2018) and is not a global supervisory authority (Apostolik & 
Donohue 2015; Pelzer 2013). The Basel Committee serves as an international cooperation 
forum (Apostolik & Donohue 2015), which helps shape banking regulations (Bhattacharya 
2010). It provides a forum for supervisory bodies to exchange their experience on how to 
further improve efficiency and transparency in the banking industry (Lessambo 2013). The 
Basel Committee lacks the legal authority to enforce the recommendations and guidelines that 
it makes (Apostolik & Donohue 2015; Pelzer 2013). 
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2.7.1.2 The Basel Accords 
The Basel Committee formulates and releases broad supervisory standards for the prudential 
supervision of the banking industry, commonly known as the Basel Accords (Boora & Kavita 
2018; Lessambo 2013; McCracken et al. 2017; Scott & Gelpern 2016). The Basel Accords are 
international regulatory frameworks that govern the activities of banks (Apostolik, Donohue & 
Went 2009), which intends to align banking risks (Bhattacharya 2010) through the Basel 
Capital Accords. While the Basel Accords are neither a treaty (Scott & Gelpern 2016) nor 
regulations (Apostolik & Donohue 2015), they are followed worldwide by banking and 
financial regulators, both in developing and developed countries (Boora & Kavita 2018; Pelzer 
2013). 
The Basel Accords serves as an international banking standard for regulations and supervision 
of banking (Apostolik & Donohue 2015; Lessambo 2013). These Basel norms provide a 
structured approach, facilitating banking and financial regulators and supervisors, and 
identifying banking to identify risks (Apostolik & Donohue 2015). In addition, the Basel 
Accords provide a structured approach to link these identified risks directly with banks’ 
capital (Apostolik & Donohue 2015). The Basel Accords thus provide a standard for 
mitigating the risks inherent to banking business (Apostolik, Donohue & Went 2009). In short, 
they serve as international regulatory standards and protocols for identifying and mitigating the 
risks inherent to banking business (Lessambo 2013; Apostolik & Donohue 2015). The Basel 
III Accords have been considered as international banking regulations, providing an 
opportunity for strengthening the risk management system in the banking industry (Boora & 
Kavita 2018). Specifically, adopting international capital standards and the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) are key protocols to risk management (Ayadi 
et al. 2016). However, one of the most important aspects in understanding the Basel Accords 
is that financial rules issued by the Basel Committee are generally ‘soft-law’ (McCracken et 
al. 2017). These are rules that have non-binding agreements (McCracken et al. 2017). 
The three Accords issued by the Basel Committee are the Basel I, II and III. A discussion of 
these three evolving Accords is beyond the scope of this project. However, all three of the 
Basel Accords are closely related to each other (Apostolik & Donohue 2015) and reflect recent 
developments in the financial industry (Apostolik & Donohue 2015). For instance, the three 
Basel Accords recognise that a bank’s inherent risks are related to the bank’s capital (Apostolik 
& Donohue 2015). The Basel Accords also support that maintaining adequate high-level bank 
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capital alone is not sufficient to ensure financial stability (Apostolik & Donohue 2015). Thus, 
these Accords help banks, as well as banking and financial regulators and supervisors, to 
mitigate their risks (Apostolik & Donohue 2015; Lessambo 2013; McCracken et al. 2017). 
2.7.2 Legal Architectures of Banking in Nepal 
Generally, BFIs are subject to the regulatory requirements of their domestic banking and 
financial regulators. Governments legislate different Acts and Laws for facilitating, regulating 
and constraining the activities of corporations registered under their jurisdictions, while banks 
are subject to the country’s common law; there are Acts, laws and regulations that govern the 
behaviours of BFIs. Within the context of the Nepalese financial system, all BFIs are 
incorporated as public limited companies under the Company Act (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). 
The banking and financial sector of Nepal is regulated by various Acts, regulations, Bylaws; 
accordingly, regulators regulate different sectors of the financial system. For instance, the 
Central Bank of Nepal, Nepal Rastra Bank, is both the regulator and supervisor of BFIs (Bank 
Supervision Department 2018). Another independent regulator of non-banking sectors is the 
Securities Board of Nepal (SEBON), which regulates the security market (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018). Contractual saving institutions, such as Employee Provident Fund (EPF) 
and Citizen Investment Trust (CIT), operate under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Finance (Bank Supervision Department 2018). Similarly, the Insurance Board (IB) regulates 
insurance companies (Bank Supervision Department 2018). Thus, the Nepalese financial 
system has multiple sectors, which are regulated by more than one regulating body. Because 
this project aims to explore about the risk management of commercial banks, its focus is the 
banking system in Nepal, and the Acts, rules and Bylaws that regulate and govern the 
operations of commercial banks. The following section covers the legal architectures of the 
Nepalese banking sector. 
2.7.2.1 The Nepal Rastra Bank 
While the formal modern banking system commenced in Nepal in 1937 (Gajurel & Pradhan 
2012), the Central Bank of Nepal came into existence only in 1956 (Gajurel & Pradhan 2012). 
The Nepal Rastra Bank was established as Central Bank in Nepal, under the Nepal Rastra Bank 
Act 1955, to carry out the functions of a central bank. The NRB mostly regulates and supervises 
commercial banks, development banks, finance companies, microfinance institutions, FINGOs 
and cooperatives, carrying out limited banking activities (Bank Supervision Department 2018). 
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As a regulator and supervisor of BFIs in Nepal, the NRB is responsible for maintaining the 
safety, stability and soundness of individual banks as well as the overall banking system (Bank 
Supervision Department 2018). The role of the Rastra Bank will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4. 
2.7.2.2 Regulatory Frameworks 
Various legislative provisions facilitate the NRB’s regulatory and supervisory role. According 
to the Nepal Rastra Bank (2018), the legal architecture governing the Nepalese financial system 
is grouped broadly into three areas. The first category comprises the Acts that govern the Rastra 
Bank’s functions (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). The Nepal Rastra Bank Act falls under this 
category. The second category includes those Acts that govern the whole banking system, 
which is under the Rastra Bank’s regulation (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). Examples are BAFIA, 
Organized Crime Prevention Act 2013, Money (Asset) Laundering Prevention Act 2008, 
Banking Offence and Punishment Act 2008, and Banks and Financial Institutions Debt 
Recovery Act 2002 (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). Some of these Acts are amended regularly to 
incorporate the changing economic and financial contexts. For instance, in 2015, the NRB 
made its second amendment to the Money (Asset) Laundering Prevention Act 2008 (Nepal 
Rastra Bank 2018). Similarly, the Banking Offence and Punishment Act 2008 was first 
amended in 2016 to expand the scope of banking offences to include cooperatives and 
‘Dhukuti’. 
The third category includes rules, Bylaws and Directives, as well as guidelines that the NRB 
issues for the operation and regulation of the banking system, including its activities (Nepal 
Rastra Bank 2018). According to Nepal Rastra Bank (2018), the NRB issues prudential 
regulations and guidelines in the form of Directives. Directives play a crucial role in 
maintaining financial stability in the economy and helps to enhance public confidence in the 
financial system (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018).  
A discussion on each of these legal architecture categories is beyond the scope of this project. 
From this section on regulatory frameworks, however, it can be understood that while the ‘soft-
laws’ created by the Basel Committee are non-binding agreements, they influence the content 
of national regulations and the behaviour of regulators and market participants (McCracken et 
al. 2017). More importantly, it can be observed that, like other developed and developing 
economies, Nepal is legislating new regulations to direct the corporate activities, behaviours 
and systems. 
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2.8 Scope of Risk Governance 
According to Tricker (2019), corporate governance focuses on a set of players including 
shareholders, the board of directors and management. However, risk governance is broad in its 
scope. The Basel Committee has emphasised the role of all staff in risk management explicitly, 
strengthening each section’s accountability by clearly demarcating the board responsibilities 
for effective board oversight (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). For instance, 
the Committee’s revision of ‘Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance 2010’ 
specifically outlined the roles of boards, board-level risk committees and senior management 
in risk management, including the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and audit department (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). Therefore, every staff member and each section of 
a bank has a different role in risk management. The following section elaborates on the 
accountability of the board and senior management. 
2.8.1 Risk Governance at Board Level 
Each person at all levels is responsible for risk management (Sheedy & Lubonjanski 2018). 
One of the most crucial questions, however, is who is, or who should be, ultimately responsible 
for the risk management of a company (Choi 2013). Haan and Vlahu (2016) state that 
shareholders appoint the board of directors to control the managers and to ensure that the firm 
is running in shareholders’ interest. Thus, the boards are responsible for activities such as 
making decisions, creating value, and monitoring and advising management on the 
shareholders’ behalf; therefore, the board of directors are accountable for the risk management 
function (Choi 2013). There is not one specific, universally accepted model or system for the 
risk governance mechanism, as every bank has different risk management policies and 
strategies to manage their risks (Chen & Lin 2016). Moreover, different categories of risks 
require unique risk management approaches (Kaplan & Mikes 2012). 
There are different schools of thought as well as various practices on how risk oversight 
functions should be delegated, either to the entire board or through several board committees. 
Some have advocated that risk management responsibilities should be entrusted to the whole 
board, while others suggested that there should be an audit committee at board level to oversee 
the risk management processes. Sheedy and Lubojanski (2018) view that risk management is 
not the responsibility of senior management or risk specialists.  Some believe that a stand-alone 
Board RMC should be accountable for risk oversight (Ittner & Keusch 2016). For instance, the 
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Basel Committee recommends establishing board-level committees for the boards’ risk 
oversight role (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). Du Plessis et al. (2015) state 
that the major reason behind establishing several board committees is to assist the board 
in fulfilling their primary functions of directing and supervising management to achieve 
the company’s objectives. The question that now arises in establishing board-level 
committees is: ‘Will the risk management of BFIs become more efficient and effective with 
the establishment of risk management board sub-committees? The following section explains 
how the establishment and separation of risk committees can be essential to BFIs. 
2.8.1.1 Is the Institutionalisation of Separate Risk Committees Necessary? 
With the evolving risk oversight functions of boards, how should the risk governance of banks 
and financial institutions be instituted? How should the board of a bank structure itself, in terms 
of managing risks? What would guide the board’s risk governance process? Who should be 
accountable for the bank’s risk oversight function? Why there is a need for the separate 
institutionalisation of committees, such as audit and risk management committees, for the 
bank’s risk oversight function? The need for the separate institutionalisation of committees, 
such as audit and risk committees, for risk oversight function is justified below. 
First, in Gupta and Leech’s (2014) view, the traditional audit approach of reporting to the board 
focuses on communicating about topics such as the effectiveness of internal controls, 
compliance to both internal policies and procedures, and external regulatory requirements. This 
traditional approach of communication does not contain sufficient breadth and depth of risk 
information that is essential for boards to discharge their fiduciary duties for risk oversight 
(Gupta & Leech 2014). Second, as explained by Ittner and Keusch (2016), an audit committee 
has a heavy workload in terms of preparing financial reports and assessing compliance 
requirements. Thus, the additional risk oversight role could only increase their already heavy 
workload. In other words, an audit committee would not be able to fulfil their risk governance 
role because they might be overwhelmed by the increasing requirements and complex financial 
reporting standards and internal controls (Choi 2013). 
The audit committee’s time, resources or expertise may be no longer enough to assess and 
manage the broad range of risks that an organisation is facing (Jaeger 2015). Choi (2013) also 
viewed the skills and expertise possessed by the audit committee as being different from that 
needed for the role of risk governance. For instance, the audit committee may require an 
additional number of people in the committee, as well as additional training and development 
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plans for their staff to carry out the additional risk management role. Thus, the resource 
constraints of the audit committee are the third reason that supports establishing a separate risk 
committee. 
The fourth reason is that the board needs to have a prospective outlook for risk oversight 
(Murphy 2011). The board members should necessarily require prospective focus for 
approving business plans and strategies (Murphy 2011). However, as mentioned earlier, the 
audit committee usually has a retrospective outlook, and the risk management committee has 
both prospective and retrospective viewpoints (Murphy 2011). To balance both these outlook 
dimensions, a separate risk management committee is needed (Murphy 2011). 
The differences in the roles of the risk management and audit committees, in terms of the board-
level risk oversight role, are summarised in Appendix 2-1. 
2.8.2 Risk Governance at Senior Management Level 
With the evolution of risk oversight functions, how should senior management support the 
board of directors to discharge their risk oversight function effectively? How should the risk 
governance of banks and financial institutions be instituted? How should banks structure their 
management functions, in terms of managing the risks? What would guide the risk governance 
process of senior managers? How should they be accountable for the bank’s risk oversight 
function? 
Tricker (2019) claims that a crucial area in corporate governance is the relationship between 
senior management and the board. Tricker (2019) states that the board delegates some of its 
functions to their senior management. However, the company’s freedom to delegate the board’s 
responsibilities to senior management depends on their Article of Association and 
Memorandum of Association, and more importantly, the regulatory requirements (Tricker 
2019). One of the mechanisms for delegating the board’s risk oversight responsibilities to 
senior management is the appointment of the CRO. 
According to Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014), the GFC highlighted the need to re-empower the 
CRO’s role. Several factors, such as independence, stature and resources, must be reviewed in 
terms of strengthening the CRO’s authority. According to Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014), the 
CRO should be placed at the senior management level within the organisational structure. One 
of the CRO’s key roles as a committee member is to represent senior management at the board’s 
risk management committee (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014). The key reason for appointing a 
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CRO at the senior level is to ensure that the CRO can act as a risk strategist (Crouhy, Galai & 
Mark 2014). As a risk strategist, the CRO not only provides an independent and strong voice 
to determine which risks banks should assume but, more importantly, helps to manage those 
risks (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014). Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014) further state that the CRO 
should attend board meetings regularly. The CRO should also have a direct reporting line to 
either the board or its risk committee, along with reporting to the CEO and management 
committee (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2014). This reporting line facilitates the CRO to 
communicate and inform the board and management committee about the risk policies, risk 
methodologies and other risk issues down through the organisation (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 
2014). In other words, holding direct and regular meetings with the board and its risk committee 
allows the CRO to inform and report to the board and its risk committee regarding risks issues 
and exposures. 
2.9 Previous Studies on Risk Management–Related Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms 
The previous literature on risk governance has focused on examining externally observable risk 
governance mechanisms. For instance, Sheedy and Griffin (2018) confirm that prior research 
in the areas of risk management and corporate governance in banking has mostly investigated 
externally observable, risk management–related corporate governance mechanisms, such as the 
existence and structure of board-level and senior management–level committees responsible 
for risks management in the banks, along with the reporting line. Stulz (2016) agrees that prior 
risk governance literature has focused on determining whether or not a board has established 
its risk committee. Further, Stulz (2016) states that prior literature has focused on analysing 
how often these committees met, and in which areas did the members have expertise. 
To elaborate, Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), and Mongiardino and Plath (2010) investigated 
the presence of board-level committees accountable for risk issues, their frequency of meeting, 
and the risk committee’s composition. Mongiardino and Plath (2010), and Aebi, Sabato and 
Schmid (2012), have also analysed the CRO’s presence, reporting line and status in the 
organisational structure. Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) analysed the existence of 
independent directors, directors’ experience, and activities undertaken by the risk committees. 
Likewise, Murphy (2011) studied 25 banking companies to examine publicly disclosed 
corporate governance elements related to the risk management, such as audit function, risk 
management department and independence of the boards. The use of proxies – such as 
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existence of board-level committees, composition of these committees, frequency of committee 
meetings, and presence and reporting line of the CRO – however, do not in themselves 
guarantee strong risk management practices (Aebi, Sabato & Schmid 2012; Mongiardino & 
Plath 2010; Murphy 2011; Sheedy & Griffin 2018). 
Similarly, there is no evidence that the presence of a dedicated risk committee influences the 
extent of a board’s involvement in risk oversight (Ittner & Keusch 2016). Sheedy and Griffin 
(2018) shared similar views, arguing that the effectiveness of risk governance depends not only 
on the existence of structures and policies but in the way that those structures and policies are 
implemented. The existence of proxies of risk governance elements is a key ingredient, which 
forms the basis for sound risk management practices (Eckblad, Black & Ogunro 2015; 
Mongiardino & Plath 2010; Sheedy & Griffin 2018). Nahar, Jubb and Azim (2016) claim that 
forming risk committees is an effective means of making these committees ultimately 
accountable for managing risks, by constantly identifying, measuring and communicating, 
reporting and monitoring the risk profiles of the business; approving the bank’s risk appetite; 
and formulating strategies for embracing risks. Therefore, these risk governance proxies can 
provide a sound base on which to build effective risk management. 
2.10 Risk Governance–Related Weaknesses Identified in the Nepalese 
Banking System 
The Bank Supervision Department (2017) claims that the Nepalese financial system has poor 
corporate governance. The practice of effective risk management is low in the Nepalese 
banking sector (Bank Supervision Department 2015), even though the NRB has issued Risk 
Management Guidelines that are based on the core Basel principles of setting standards for risk 
management (Bank Supervision Department 2015). The Post Report (cited in Sharma 2014) 
states that a Central Bank official has the opinion that there is ‘bad corporate governance’ in 
the Nepalese banking system, and that this poor corporate governance practice has been the 
largest problem for both individual banks and the system itself. The Bank Supervision 
Department, which carries out the supervision of commercial banks, has been pointing out this 
weakness in risk management and corporate governance issues since 2001. The Bank 
Supervision Department, which started publishing annual supervision reports in 2001–2002, 
has furnished information on violations of regulatory requirements by each commercial bank. 
However, from 2007 onwards, the Bank Supervision Department has provided this information 
only in a summary version of the overall banking system. From 2008, the Nepal Rastra Bank 
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also started to furnish its enforcement actions through a separate link on its website. The details 
of these enforcement actions are discussed further in Section 4.5. 
Some of the breaches on risk governance practices discussed in the Bank Supervision 
Department’s annual reports are demonstrated below. According to the Bank Supervision 
Department (2001–2002), Kumari Bank Limited and Himalayan Bank were not complying 
with NRB Directives regarding the appointment of the Banks’ Chairmen. Similarly, promoters 
of Nepalese commercial banks influenced the banks’ functioning, including the recruitment of 
staff and lending decisions (Bank Supervision Department 2002–2003). During its onsite 
examination of commercial banks in 2004/05, the Bank Supervision Department observed 
significant lapses in areas of corporate governance (Bank Supervision Department 2004–
2005). Examples of such shortcomings include the CEO of Laxmi Bank Limited being a 
permanent invitee to the Audit Committee (Bank Supervision Department 2004–2005). This 
practice was against the provision of the Directive on corporate governance (Bank Supervision 
Department 2004–2005). In the same year, the Chairperson of  Standard Chartered Bank Nepal 
Limited (SCB) was found to be a member of the Audit Committee (Bank Supervision 
Department 2004–2005). This practice was also not desirable for good corporate governance 
(Bank Supervision Department 2004–2005). Likewise, the director of Everest Bank Limited 
(EBL) was found to be involved directly in the bank’s daily functioning (Bank Supervision 
Department 2004–2005). 
In addition, EBL and Siddhartha Bank Limited did not comply with the number of meetings 
needing to be conducted by the board of directors (Bank Supervision Department 2004–2005). 
During the onsite examination, Siddhartha Bank Limited’s director was found to be a member 
of the bank’s Credit Committee and Audit Committee (Bank Supervision Department 2004–
2005). Bank of Kathmandu Limited’s internal audit department was responsible for NRB 
reporting and other tasks (Bank Supervision Department 2004–2005). The internal audit 
department of Bank of Kathmandu Limited was inadequate, in terms of the nature and volume 
of the bank’s transactions (Bank Supervision Department 2004–2005). According to the Bank 
Supervision Department (2004–2005), the Board meeting minutes of Bank of Kathmandu 
Limited did not contain adequate information. The minutes were found to be in a much-
summarised form (Bank Supervision Department 2004–2005). All these risk governance 
practices of commercial banks showed that banks were not complying with the provisions of 
corporate governance directives. It then follows that every Nepalese commercial bank, to some 
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extent, has shortcomings in the area of good corporate governance practices (Bank Supervision 
Department 2004–2005). 
As stated earlier, the Bank Supervision Department started to publish annual supervision 
reports in 2001–2002. These annual reports furnished the detailed reports on commercial 
banks’ risk governance practice until 2006. From 2007, however, the Bank Supervision 
Department has been furnishing only a summary of the banks’ risk governance practices. 
During the onsite examination of commercial banks, discrepancies identified in the areas of 
corporate governance and risk management practices included lack of effectiveness of the audit 
committee and internal audit function, and independence of Directors (Bank Supervision 
Department 2007). The Bank Supervision Department (2019) claims that, in some banks, the 
risk management function is not independent of the business function. The Bank Supervision 
Department (2019) further claims that oversight by the board and senior management is not 
adequate. 
In some cases, the same individual is responsible for both business and control functions (Bank 
Supervision Department 2019). This risk governance practice and system show that there is 
poor segregation of duties and responsibilities, which further hinders in ascertaining the 
necessary checks and balances. This inadequate segregation of duties and responsibilities also 
creates a conflict of interest for assigned roles. More importantly, the weaknesses identified in 
these risk management and corporate governance issues indicate that there are insufficient 
policies and procedures in place (Bank Supervision Department 2019). Adherence to these 
documents is not adequately monitored (Bank Supervision Department 2019). The above 
discussion on risk governance in the Nepalese banking industry reveals that, to some extent, 
every Nepalese commercial bank has shortcomings in the areas of good corporate governance 
practices. However, it also indicates that some of the weaknesses in risk management and 
corporate governance issues, which have been identified since 2001, are still in existence in the 
banking sector (Bank Supervision Department 2019). 
2.11 Theoretical Framework for Corporate Governance 
One of the essential building blocks in the research process, claims Losoncz (2017), is the 
theoretical rationale. Theoretical rationale provides a lens to look at the world and to make 
sense of what it means (Losoncz 2017). As mentioned in Section 2.5.1, corporate governance 
is diverse in meaning and scope and varies with the type of lens used to view it. Likewise, 
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corporate governance has drawn on varieties of theories from distinct academic disciplines 
(Padgett 2012), such as finance, accounting, management, law, sociology and economics 
(Zattoni & Van Ees 2012). Each of these academic fields offers a distinctive theoretical 
perspective on a company’s governance (Padgett 2012). The ‘basic theories in corporate 
governance emerged with the agency theory which extended into stewardship theory and 
stakeholder theory and evolved to resource dependency theory, political theory, legitimacy 
theory and social contract theory’ (Yusoff & Alhaji 2012, p. 52). Borlea and Achim (2013, 
p. 117) also view that theories of corporate governance are rooted in agency theory, which later 
developed into stewardship theory and stakeholder theory, and further advanced into the 
theories of resource dependence, transaction cost, political, ethics, information asymmetry and 
efficient markets. 
Any individual theory cannot best explain a practical and effective governance mechanism 
(Borlea & Achim 2013; Yusoff & Alhaji 2012). Further, there is no single corporate 
governance theory to pinpoint in the understanding of corporate governance mechanisms 
(Borlea & Achim 2013; Padgett 2012). Therefore, scholars are encouraged to apply a 
combination of existing corporate governance theories (Borlea & Achim 2013; Yusoff & 
Alhaji 2012). In line with the research questions developed in Chapter 1, this project used the 
agency and regulatory theories to understand the corporate governance mechanism of Nepal’s 
commercial banks. The following section briefly explains each theory and the rationale for 
applying these theories to this project. 
2.11.1 Public Interest Theory 
Section 2.7, above, explained why banking is the most regulated industry worldwide. Section 
2.7 also explained why compliance with various regulatory requirements is essential in the 
banking industry. Haines (2017) views that it is complicated to understand why and when some 
regulations are forthcoming. In such a context, finding a suitable theoretical framework helps 
to understand the regulations. Using an appropriate regulatory theoretical lens helps to 
understand why regulation is essential and how regulation is developed (Deegan 2016). 
Regulatory theories, such as public interest theory, capture theory and economic interest group 
theory of regulation (Deegan 2016), explain different perspectives on why and how regulations 
are introduced. Public interest theory views that regulations are initiated by the regulatory body 
to benefit society as a whole (Deegan 2016, p. 112). Other theorists of regulations, however, 
suggest that regulations are introduced to benefit some vested group of people at the expense 
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of others (Deegan 2016, p. 112). For instance, where policy is changing rapidly in corporate 
governance regulation (Padgett 2012), there are many motives for introducing corporate 
governance regulations. Particularly, regulators globally are converging corporate governance 
mechanisms as a part of learning from and adopting the best international practices, or as part 
of fulfilling a group’s interest, such as investors’ demands, pressure and encouragement for 
adopting good practices of corporate governance (Padgett 2012). Some examples of best 
international practices in corporate governance mechanisms are separation of the CEO and 
Chairperson’s role in a company, and establishment of a board sub-committee for the effective 
functioning of the entire board (Padgett 2012). 
Researchers who embrace public interest theory assume that a regulatory body is established 
to represent the wider interests of society and serve the public interest (Deegan 2016). For the 
public interest theorist, legislations are enacted to balance social benefits with social costs 
(Deegan 2016). For instance, while risk and regulation seem paradoxical to some extent, to 
reduce the vulnerability of a wide variety of risks to a tolerable level, risk and regulations are 
often combined (Haines 2017). Similarly, regulators globally wish to find out the best solutions 
to their corporate governance problems (Padgett 2012). This project has focused on analysing 
best international practices in the risk governance mechanism adopted by the Rastra Bank. 
Therefore, the use of public interest theory would be suitable for this project. 
2.11.2 Agency Theory 
Section 2.4.2, above, discussed how the risk management function in banking is unique 
compared to other firms, and why risk management is essential. Section 2.4.2 also discussed 
that banks face a conflict of interest from multiple stakeholders and are also subject to moral 
hazards. This line of discussion then asks the question, in whose interest should the companies 
be operated (Padgett 2012). Tricker (2019) views that, while corporate governance has 
numerous theoretical perspectives, it neither has a single widely accepted theoretical base nor 
a generally accepted paradigm (Tricker 2019). However, agency theory is being viewed as 
being synonymous of corporate governance theory (Lubatkin 2007). This theory assumes that 
shareholders are the principals of firms, the board of directors are the agents – and that the 
board of directors lead and make decisions in the shareholders’ interest (Borlea & Achim 2013; 
Padgett 2012). In other words, agency theory views corporate governance as the mechanism to 
find an effective means of monitoring managers’ actions to ensure that management acts on 
the shareholders’ behalf (Padgett 2012). 
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From the agency theory perspective, the important entities in the corporate governance of a 
company are the shareholders, managers and board of directors (Tricker 2019). For instance, 
shareholders own the company; managers oversee the day-to-day activities, such as selecting 
and executing the firm’s decisions; and the board of directors approve those decisions (García‐
Sánchez & García‐Meca 2018). Agency theory assumes that to reduce moral hazards and 
harmonise the conflict of interest among different entities of the firm, the shareholders hold a 
unique place in the company’s corporate governance mechanism (Padgett 2012). From the 
perspective of agency theory in corporate governance, shareholders can monitor management 
through the mechanisms of the board of directors and auditors (Padgett 2012). Shareholders 
appoint the board of directors to control managers’ behaviours and to ensure that the  
firm is running in the shareholders’ interest (Haan & Vlahu 2016). The board of directors 
is responsible for monitoring and controlling managerial decision-making to protect the 
shareholders’ interest (Yusoff & Alhaji 2012). Therefore, the board of directors appointed by 
shareholders owes their fiduciary duty to the shareholders (Padgett 2012). 
This project has focused on analysing the different risk governance mechanisms of the 
Nepalese banking sector, such as at the board and senior management levels. Agency theory 
assumes that corporate governance is the mechanism to find an effective means of monitoring 
the managers’ actions to ensure that they act on the shareholders’ behalf. Based on these 
arguments, applying agency theory in this project would be appropriate to understand the roles 
of the board of directors and senior management level in the banks’ risk oversight function. 
2.12 Summary of Literatures and Its Implication for Research Questions 
The above sections have assisted in understanding why risk governance is essential in the 
banking industry. The above sections also highlighted how risk regulations at both national and 
international level support in building robust governance structures. This project has 
investigated the risk governance features that are similar to previous studies (Aebi, Sabato & 
Schmid 2012; Ittner & Keusch 2016; Mongiardino & Plath 2010; Murphy 2011). This project 
differs from these studies mentioned above, however, because this research investigation 
focuses on analysing the risk governance features within the context of the Nepalese banking 
industry. In the first stage, this research project attempts to explore in what way the NRB has 
adopted the Basel Accords, relating to the board and senior management risk oversight 
function. By comparing and contrasting the principles and mechanisms of the board and senior 
 
Chapter Two – Literature Review   37 
 
management of the NRB requirements against the Basel Accords, the project aims to identify 
whether or not the NRB has implemented the Basel Principles with the same motivation. 
In the second stage, this project analyses whether the sample banks are complying with their 
regulatory requirements, in terms of the board and senior management’s roles for risk 
oversight. It compares risk governance structures across the sample commercial banks to assess 
their compliance with regulatory requirements. The results of this comparison help to gain 
insights into whether or not the commercial banks across Nepal have similar board-level 
committees and senior management for overseeing the banks’ risks. Thus, this project explores 
the NRB’s implementation of the Basel Accords by considering the risk management–related 
corporate governance that has been investigated by previous risk governance scholars. 
2.13 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the relevant concepts and literature in risk governance. It showed that 
risk management practices are essential functions in both financial and non-financial 
institutions. This chapter also established that there has been increased and renewed interest in 
corporate governance regulations and practices of companies to enhance their risk management 
practices. It then summarised the national and international risk governance protocols, which 
focus on enhancing the risk governance practices of the banking sector. Similarly, it also 
explained the risk governance weaknesses entrenched in the Nepalese banking industry, despite 
regulations being issued by the Rastra Bank. This chapter identified the theoretical lens to be 
used in this project to understand the risk governance practices of Nepalese commercial banks. 
Similarly, this chapter indicated the framework for which risk management–related corporate 
governance mechanism would be investigated for exploring the risk governance of Nepalese 
commercial banks. The following chapter discusses the research design applied to this project 
to address the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER  3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the rationales behind each aspect of the research design employed in this 
project to address the research questions formulated in Chapter 1. Specifically, Section 3.2 
explains the methodology and research design applied to this project. Section 3.3 provides 
justifications for using the sampling methods and outlines the sample size. Section 3.4 justifies 
the data and data collection methods employed in this project. Section 3.5 explains the various 
data analysis tools used. Finally, Section 3.6 contains the conclusion of Chapter 3. 
3.2 Methodology and Research Design 
The selection of a research approach is dependent on various factors, such as the research 
questions and significant contributions that scholars aim to make in their field of study (Bluhm 
et al. 2011; Zikmund et al. 2013). The following section justifies the methodology used, and 
the research design applied for this study. 
3.2.1 Methodology 
As explained in Section 1.5 of Chapter 1, this project aims to gain in-depth knowledge about 
the risk governance practices of Nepalese banks with the adaptation of Basel’s Principles. In 
other words, the study aims to describe and explore why and how Nepal’s banking regulator is 
adopting and adapting the international best practices for risk governance. This argument 
follows from the focus and context of the study, which primarily concerns the commercial 
banks operating in Nepal. Yin (cited in Lee 1999) claims that a case study research design is 
appropriate when the research aims to examine why and how contemporary organisation 
phenomena occur in natural settings. Following the above arguments and research questions 
developed for this project, this project is a case study of the risk governance of the Nepalese 
banking industry, and of the commercial banks in particular. Similarly, the case study design 
allows exploring the research field in more detail (Lee 1999; Thomas 2013) because the case 
study allows the researcher to focus on one or a relatively small set of cases (Lee 1999; 
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Maxwell 2013; Thomas 2013). Thus, these arguments justify that, to achieve the project’s 
objective, the case study method is the most suitable to apply. 
3.2.2 Research Design 
The research questions introduced in Chapter 1 suggest that a qualitative methodology is the 
most appropriate research design to apply for this project. Governance scholars have 
recommended the use of a qualitative research design to explore corporate governance 
phenomena. For instance, a qualitative research study can be an important methodology to 
explore corporate governance phenomena, particularly within the national context (McNulty, 
Zattoni, & Douglas 2013). McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) argue that using rigorous 
qualitative methods in the exploration of governance phenomena can help governance scholars 
to consider a country’s specific legal and cultural foundations, which affect the governance 
issues of a particular nation. Thus, a qualitative research design can facilitate a richer and more 
profound understanding and knowledge of governance phenomena, which can contribute to 
build and improve more effective governance mechanisms (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 
2013). Similarly, the qualitative research design allows the governance scholar a basis to 
rethink and challenge how governance actors function in reality (McNulty, Zattoni & 
Douglas 2013; Zattoni, Douglas & Judge 2013). Yasin, Muhamad and Sulaiman (2014) 
view that rigorous and relevant qualitative research methods allow scholars to gather in-
depth information in the field of corporate governance. Qualitative research is suitable to 
gain a better understanding of corporate governance phenomena (McNulty, Zattoni & 
Douglas 2013; Zattoni, Douglas & Judge 2013). 
Maxwell (cited in Maxwell 2013) claims that qualitative research design allows for an 
understanding of how events, processes, actions and meanings are shaped by the unique 
contexts in which these events and actions occur. Qualitative research also allows for 
comprehending how participants understand the events and actions that are taking place in a 
particular situation (Maxwell 2013). It allows for recognising how participants’ understanding 
of these events and process can influence their behaviours (Maxwell 2013). Based on the 
project’s research aims, research questions, research gap and the above arguments of McNulty, 
Zattoni and Douglas (2013); Zattoni, Douglas and Judge (2013); and Yasin, Muhamad and 
Sulaiman (2014), it follows that a qualitative research design is the best to employ for this 
project. Hence, the qualitative methodology is applied in this study. 
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3.3 Sample of the Project 
Nepalese commercial banks have different ownership structures. Based on their ownership 
pattern, the banks of Nepal are categorised into different groups. For example, in Nepal, 
commercial banks are categorised broadly into public and private banks, based on the banks’ 
ownership and control (Bank Supervision Department 2019). The privately-owned commercial 
banks in Nepal can be further grouped into fully-owned domestic banks and banks with foreign 
joint investments, known as foreign joint-venture banks (Bank Supervision Department 2019). 
Table 3-1: Classification and Total Number of Commercial Banks Based on Ownership 
Structure as at Mid-July 2018 
Classification and Total Number of Commercial Banks Based on Ownership 
Structure as at Mid-July 2018 
Public Banks Private Banks 
With Full Local 
Ownership 
With Foreign Ownership 
3 20 5 
Total Commercial Banks  28 
Source: Bank Supervision Department (2019) 
As shown in Table 3-1, above, 28 commercial banks were operating in Nepal as at mid-July 
2018 (Bank Supervision Department 2019). As mentioned in Chapter 1, a full list of Nepalese 
commercial banks is in Appendix 1-3. 
Initially, this project aimed to include and select at least one bank from each category 
represented in Table 3-1, to represent all categories of banks in the project’s sample. However, 
due to data limitations, the project could not include banks with all ownership structures as 
initially proposed. These data limitations related to the full set of data available from 
commercial banks’ annual reports, as well as the cost and time involved in translating the 
annual reports from Nepali into English. For instance, all banks from the public bank category 
were excluded from the study because the complete data set from these three banks were not 
available on their websites. Similarly, the majority of commercial banks with full local 
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ownership did not make their full set of data available in the English language. Therefore, these 
banks were also not considered for the sample of the project. 
Given these limitations, the project used two primary sampling criteria: availability of a full set 
of primary data, and availability of annual reports in the English language. Thus, to analyse the 
risk governance practice of banks among Nepalese commercial banks, this project used the 
convenience sampling method (Savin-Baden & Major 2013). The sample for this project 
consists of four banks operating in Nepal: two banks with full local ownership, and two banks 
with foreign ownership. Precisely, this project selected Citizens Bank International Limited 
(CTZN) and Sunrise Bank Limited (SRBL), representing banks with full local ownership; and 
SCB and EBL, representing banks with foreign ownership. 
3.4 Data and Data Collection 
As mentioned in Chapter 1: Introduction, this project aims to gain an in-depth understanding 
of the risk governance practices of commercial banks regarding the Basel Principles. Therefore, 
this project focuses on the implementation of the Basel Accords by the Rastra Bank and 
Nepalese commercial banks. It follows from this objective that this project can collect data 
from public documents. Savin-Baden and Major (2013) claim that researchers can retrieve 
information and data from public documents to understand the research context. Stake (1995) 
also views public documents as appropriate when researchers cannot observe and record 
research activities directly. Thus, public textual documents were used to collect the data for 
this project. A crucial question to address, however, was where and how to locate the official 
public documents that could serve as primary data for the study. 
The research objective and research questions formulated in Chapter 1 indicate that this project 
requires three sets of primary data. First, the Basel Accords documents, which provide the 
frameworks on the risk governance mechanism for banks. Second, the Rastra Bank’s 
documents, which mandate commercial banks in implementing risk governance mechanisms 
through various laws and regulations. The Rastra Bank documents are indispensable because 
these documents provide the benchmark against the Basel Accords and the commercial banks’ 
practice. The third set of data for this project is the annual reports of commercial banks, which 
can confirm whether or not banks have been implementing those regulatory requirements. 
An annual report is one type of public textual document, which contains and communicates a 
corporation’s mission, activities, performance and strategic plans. A company’s annual report 
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is also generally easily accessible to the public. Lajili and Zéghal (2005) state that banks’ 
annual reports contain both qualitative and quantitative risk information about the corporation. 
Nahar, Azim and Jubb (2016) also confirm that the annual reports of firms contain strong risk 
information. The qualitative researchers in the field of corporate governance have used archival 
data from annual reports as the primary data source in their studies. For example, Bluhm et 
al. (2011) states that archival data was the second-most commonplace method used in 
qualitative research. The findings of McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) also supported the 
claim made by Bluhm et al. (2011). 
Some of the studies that used annual reports to assess the risk governance practices are detailed 
as follows. To assess the risk governance practices of 20 large commercial and universal banks 
from Europe and North America, Mongiardino and Plath (2010) obtained data from 2007 and 
2008 from annual reports and proxy reports. Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) had hand-
collected risk governance variables from banks’ annual reports through their websites. 
Likewise, to examine the extent of risk disclosure by 30 banks in Bangladesh, Ittner and Keusch 
(2016) hand-collected data from the annual reports of banks, which they obtained from multiple 
sources. Nahar, Azim and Jubb (2016) also hand-collected the primary data from banks’ annual 
reports over six years to examine the changes in the risk disclosure practices of banks in 
Bangladesh. Therefore, using archival data, such as a company’s annual report, is a popular 
qualitative method in research on corporate governance. 
The study period of this project covered the three fiscal years from 2015/2016 to 2017/2018. 
The main reason for commencing the data set from FY 2015/2016 is that the Basel Committee 
announced significant changes in international standards for risk governance mechanisms and 
risk disclosures in July 2015. McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) claim that governance 
problems and practices evolve, reflecting patterns in legislation, culture and implicit norms 
regarding relationships among stakeholders. Therefore, this justifies that commencing the data 
collection from FY 2015/2016 would be the most suitable date to explore how regulators are 
trying to cope with the governance problems and practices that are evolving over time. The 
purpose of ending the data set at FY 2017/2018 is because the annual reports of commercial 
banks for FY 2018/2019 are generally published at the end of 2019. The annual report 
publication time for a particular FY usually starts at the end of the upcoming year because the 
official FY of Nepal starts at mid-July. Thus, the data set from FY 2015/2016 to FY 2017/2018 
tends to reflect the recent situation of risk governance practices in the Nepalese banking sector. 
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This data set aims to reveal how Nepalese banking has implemented the evolving international 
standards.  
3.5 Data Analysis 
As restated in Section 3.3, above, this project aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
risk governance practices of commercial banks regarding the adoption of the Basel Principles. 
This project, therefore, analysed the data and findings in two steps. In the first stage of analysis, 
the project explored why and how the Rastra Bank has been implementing the Basel Standards 
for risk governance used by the Nepalese banking sector. This project also investigated which 
of the risk governance standards, concerning the board and senior management’s risk oversight 
function, have been adopted by the Rastra Bank for the Nepalese banking industry. In the 
second stage, data from the sample banks’ annual reports were examined against the NRB 
requirements, to investigate whether the commercial banks are fully complying with or 
diverging from those requirements. Figure 3-1 below explains the data analysis process adopted 
in this project. 
  
 
Chapter Three – Research Design   44 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Six-step data analysis process 
Source: Creswell (2014, p. 197) 
3.5.1 First Step of Analysis 
Based on the project’s aim and research questions, this project has primarily used the NRB’s 
requirements and the Basel Committee’s recommendations for understanding the risk 
governance practices of Nepalese commercial banks. It also used the past literature of risk 
governance for understanding what mechanisms constitute risk governance in banking. 
Initially, during the first stage of analysis, the use of disclosure analysis was crucial for this 
project. Disclosure analysis allows the researcher to thoroughly read the documents to 
understand the context as well as to identify themes within the data for further analysis (Savin-
Baden & Major 2013). Therefore, to understand and identify the Basel Committee’s 
recommendation and the NRB’s requirements on risk governance, this project applied 
disclosure analysis. Savin-Baden and Major (2013) view that disclosure analysis is beneficial 
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in identifying, categorising and interpreting different themes. Further, identifying the themes 
helps to narrow down the focus while searching for information (Creswell 2014). The process 
of identifying themes was helpful to capture the content of the data, which then became 
essential building blocks for the analysis (Thomas 2013). These themes, falling under headings 
and sub-headings, will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Within the context of this project, using disclosure analysis was helpful to recognise that the 
risk oversight function was a crucial element in risk governance. Applying disclosure analysis 
methods was also advantageous to recognise the scope of the risk oversight function in the 
banking industry. For example, applying disclosure analysis in this project was useful in 
categorising the themes broadly into two: first, the risk oversight function at board level, and 
second, the risk oversight function at senior management level. Thus, given the advantages and 
suitability of disclosure analysis, this method was deployed in the first stage of data analysis. 
In conjunction with disclosure analysis, the project also used the constant comparative method 
in the first stage of analysis. Because the project seeks to understand which risk governance 
mechanisms the Rastra Bank implemented in commercial banks, using the constant comparison 
method was deemed necessary for this project. Thomas (2013) claims that constant comparison 
allows the researcher to revisit the primary data as frequently as needed to compare, capture, 
describe and summarise the critical content and facets. Creswell (2014) agrees that the constant 
comparison method permits the researcher to segment and label data into different categories. 
Using the constant comparative method in this project was effective to find the similarities and 
differences in the risk governance mechanisms, as per the Basel recommendation and NRB 
requirements. Appendix 3-1 outlines the themes: risk governance at the board level and risk 
governance at the senior management level. In the first stage of analysis, the project focused 
on identifying whether or not banks were required to have the board and senior managers 
involved in the banks’ risk oversight function. For example, the project investigated whether 
or not banks are required to establish a separate board-level risk committee for managing risk. 
The project then investigated the mandates delegated to each risk committee, such as 
composition, reporting line, independence of the board-level committee, and major 
responsibilities. 
Conversely, for investigating the risk governance at senior management level, this project 
examined whether or not banks are mandated to establish an independent risk management 
unit. Similarly, the project examined if banks were obliged to appoint a CRO. In the case of 
the senior management risk oversight role, this project compared and contrasted the mandates 
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of risk management departments, as per both the Basel recommendations and NRB 
requirements. These mandates are listed in Appendix 3-1 under the sub-heading ‘Risk 
governance at senior management level’. In short, Appendix 3-1 helps to find out how similar 
or different the NRB’s requirements are with those of the Basel recommendations. The data 
relating the NRB’s requirements and the Basel Committee’s recommendations were inputted 
and sorted into a Microsoft Excel sheet. Further, comparing and contrasting the identified 
themes against the Basel recommendations were helpful to interpret whether the Nepalese 
banking regulator was following or diverging with the Basel’s guidelines of corporate 
governance. 
3.5.2 Second Step of Analysis 
In the second stage, this project investigated whether or not the sample commercial banks are 
complying with the mandates given by the Rastra Bank. The project used disclosure analysis, 
content analysis and constant comparative method to investigate the banks’ risk governance 
compliance with the regulatory requirements. The second step of analysis used disclosure 
analysis to capture data on different themes. Appendix 3-2 shows themes on the governance 
variables that are used in the project to examine whether or not the sample banks are confirming 
the mandates of risk governance mechanisms. 
The disclosure analysis in this stage allows for an understanding of whether or not the risk 
governance information, as listed in Appendix 3-2, was disclosed in the annual reports of the 
sample banks. The disclosure analysis method is also essential in the second step analysis to 
identify the section of the annual reports in which the risk governance information was 
disclosed. For this project, the primary data related to the risk governance features were hand-
collected from different sections and sub-sections of sample commercial banks’ annual reports, 
such as ‘our approach to corporate governance’, ‘corporate governance’, ‘risk governance’, 
‘risk review’, ‘board-level committee’, ‘risk management committees’, ‘organisational 
structure’, ‘a report in the activities of audit committee’, and ‘a report on the activities of risk 
management committee’. Because the risk governance information required for this project is 
qualitative, applying a content analysis was deemed necessary for this project. Lajili and Zéghal 
(2005) view that content analysis helps in capturing the extent and volume of qualitative risk 
information practices when companies primarily disclosed this risk information qualitatively. 
Therefore, this project used the content analysis method to capture data on different themes, as 
demonstrated in Appendix 3-2. This project searched for keywords such as ‘audit committee’, 
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‘risk management committee’, and ‘the CRO’ from the banks’ annual reports to capture data 
on different themes. 
Just like in the first stage of analysis, the primary data were systematically inputted and sorted 
into the Microsoft Excel sheet, year by year, for the study period of this project. Systematically 
inputting and sorting the primary data in this way helped to organise and prepare the data for 
analysis. Using the Microsoft Excel sheet was helpful in continually comparing the sample 
banks’ risk governance practices with regulatory requirements, which further assisted in 
examining whether the commercial banks are conforming with or diverging from the regulatory 
requirements. For instance, for each board-level committee, the themes focused on finding 
whether or not banks have established a separate board-level risk committee for managing risk. 
If yes, then the project investigated compliance with the regulatory mandates. The mandates 
are related to the composition, reporting line, independence of the committee, number of 
meetings conducted by the committee, time interval between each meeting, and major 
responsibilities delegated to each risk committee. This project also attempted to identify 
whether the banks have similar risk governance practices at the board level. 
Conversely, for investigating risk governance at senior management level, the themes that this 
project generated were investigating whether or not the banks in Nepal had established an 
independent risk management unit, and whether the banks had appointed a CRO in their 
organisation. The project investigated mandates and major responsibilities assigned to the risk 
management department to investigate if banks are complying with regulatory requirements. 
In addition, in the second step analysis, this project examined if the banks in Nepal have similar 
or different practices, in terms of who is heading the risk management department, whether the 
risk management department is independent, the functional title of the head of the risk 
management function, the reporting lines of the head of the risk management unit, and any dual 
responsibilities of the head of the risk management department. If the head of risk management 
had a dual functional role, then the project investigated whether this dual hatting was 
interrelated or not with the business or operation. All of these themes were analysed using 
tables wherever appropriate. 
The two-step analysis explained above illustrates how this project combined three methods: 
content analysis, disclosure analysis and constant comparative methods for analysing the data. 
Zikmund et al. (2013) agree that qualitative researchers conduct research studies in many ways 
through different techniques, which might also include a combination of two or more 
approaches. Similarly, Savin-Baden and Major (2013) view that, in a case study research 
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design, data can be analysed using various techniques. In the case study research design, data 
can be analysed using various techniques (Savin-Baden & Major 2013). Studies can discuss 
themes found under headings and sub-headings (Creswell 2014). In this project, themes are 
dicussed under different headings and sub-headings the Chapter 4. Studies can use different 
methods for coding data. To illustrate, Creswell (2014) claims that scholars could code all the 
data either by hand or using computer software. The hand-coding process allows the researcher 
to concentrate on specific data, which was later used in both comprehending the data and 
developing a small number of themes for analysis (Creswell 2014; Thomas 2013). Therefore, 
hand-coding was appropriate for this project. Likewise, in a qualitative research study, the 
researcher can also generate codes in various ways. For instance, scholars can either use 
predetermined codes or develop codes based on the prior literature or emerging information 
collected from the primary data, or in any combination of these (Creswell 2014). This project 
did not use any of the predetermined codes. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the methodology employed to answer the research questions of this 
project. Within this context, the project has applied an explanatory case study research design. 
This project used the documentary review approach and applied the convenience sampling 
method to collect the data. The combination of content analysis, disclosure analysis and 
constant comparative methods were employed to analyse and interpret the data. The following 
chapter discusses the results of the investigation. 
 
Chapter Four – Findings and Analysis   49 
 
CHAPTER  4  FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the findings and analysis of this thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 1 and 
explained in Chapter 3, this study’s results are analysed in two stages. Section 4.2 covers the 
Stage 1 analysis, where public interest and agency theories are applied to explore how and why 
the Nepal Rastra Bank has adopted the Basel Accords to use in Nepalese banking. Section 4.3 
includes the Stage 2 analysis, where the project investigates the sample banks’ risk governance 
mechanisms compliance. Section 4.4 summarises the project’s overall observations in 
implementing the Basel Norms in the Nepalese banking industry. A summary of the Nepal 
Rastra Bank’s challenges in implementing the international best practices is in Section 4.5. 
Finally, Section 4.6 provides this chapter’s conclusion. 
4.2 Stage 1 Analysis: The Nepal Rastra Bank’s Adaptation of the Basel 
Accords 
It was noted in Chapters 1 and 2 that each country adopts the Basel Accords according to its 
national law, interpretation, and requirements. This section discusses why it was essential for 
the NRB to adopt the Basel Accords in Nepal. It also discusses how the NRB adapted the Basel 
Principles for use in Nepal, and which standards the NRB adopted from the Basel Accords for 
their risk governance mechanism. 
4.2.1 Why Did Nepal and the Rastra Bank Start Adopting the Basel Principles? 
Within the context of Nepal, there are two main reasons why Nepal and the NRB had to adopt 
international best practices in the banking sector. The first reason is the liberalisation policy 
adopted by the government of Nepal during the 1980s (Nepal Rastra Bank 2005). Khatiwada 
(2005) claims that there were no significant changes in the Nepalese economy structure until 
the 1980s. In early the 1950s, for instance, the Nepalese economy depended almost exclusively 
on subsistence agriculture (Shah 1981), and agriculture contributed more than 90% of GDP in 
the 1960s (Khatiwada 2005). Similarly, there was almost no industry until the 1970s, because 
other economic activities were contributing no more than 10%–15% to the country’s total 
 
Chapter Four – Findings and Analysis   50 
 
employment and income (Shah 1981). Until early 1951, Nepal’s economy was virtually 
isolated from global economies, except for India (Shah 1981). Nepal’s trade–GDP ratio 
remained less than 15% until the 1970s (Khatiwada 2005), despite Nepal’s initiation of 
building economic relations with other countries since the 1950s (Khatiwada 2005). Further, 
while Nepal began to evolve its external trade and foreign exchange regimes in the 1960s 
(Khatiwada 2005), Nepal’s consumption expenditure on domestic goods and services still 
accounted for 84% in 1984/1985 (Khatiwada 2005). 
In recent decades, however, the Nepalese economy has made noteworthy structural shifts in 
term of compositional changes in the country’s GDP (Khatiwada 2005). As shown in Chapter 
1, with the adaptation of the liberalisation policy, Nepal made significant changes in socio-
economic conditions. The services sector, for example, has been emerging as the largest sector 
in terms of GDP composition. Section 1.3.1 of Chapter 1 also provided evidence on these 
changes in the Nepalese economy structure. 
The above discussion on the structural shift in the Nepalese GDP composition has illustrated 
that adopting the policy of liberalisation helped Nepal to open its economy and facilitate trade 
and industries among countries. The development of economic sectors other than agriculture 
and the increase in the trade–GDP ratio implies that Nepal needs to have a safe and efficient 
payment system. In recent years, however, many financial markets have made it a virtual 
necessity for countries to comply with the Basel Accord to access their market (Scott & Gelpern 
2016). To illustrate, for accessing its market, the USA requires countries to be representative 
members in the Basel Committee or to comply with the Basel Standards (Scott & Gelpern 
2016). Boora and Kavita (2018) state that banks must comply with Basel Norms. Based on the 
arguments of Scott and Gelpern (2016), and Boora and Kavita (2018), therefore, it holds that 
both a country and its banks need to be Basel-compliant. In short, the economic liberalisation 
policy adopted by Nepal implied that to facilitate its trades and payment, it needed to adopt the 
Basel Principles to have a safe and efficient payment system. 
The second reason is Nepal’s increasing membership to international organisations (Nepal 
Rastra Bank 2005). Along with its initiation to economic openness, Nepal has started to build 
up its bilateral and multilateral relations with many global organisations. Nepal obtained 
international membership to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank in 
1961. Nepal has also been a prime member of the Asian Development Bank since 1968. Nepal 
joined with the Asian Clearing Union as a principal partner in 1974. Similarly, Nepal became 
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004. Memberships to these 
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international organisations also mean that Nepal has to comply with the specific standards of 
these organisations to maintain affiliation with them. For instance, the IMF has urged countries 
to embrace the Basel Standards as a condition for its financial support and conducts periodic 
surveillance of member countries (Scott & Gelpern 2016). 
Because Nepal is a WTO member, it likewise has to comply with the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (Nepal Rastra Bank 2010). As per the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services of the WTO, effective from 1 January 2010, Nepal has to allow foreign BFIs to 
establish their branches and conduct wholesale banking transactions (Nepal Rastra Bank 2010). 
The entrance of foreign banks into the Nepalese financial system implies that Nepalese banks 
have to be competitive. Nepal’s affiliation with international organisations thus encouraged 
Nepal to open their financial market for foreign players; at the same time, it had to embrace the 
Basel Accords. From these arguments, it follows that the Nepalese banking system needed to 
adopt the Basel Standards in because of various factors, such as the government’s introduction 
of domestic’s policies, shifts in the country’s structural economic sectors, and prerequisites to 
maintain its affiliation with international bodies. 
4.2.2 How Did the Nepal Rastra Bank Start Adopting the Basel Standards? 
As discussed earlier, Nepalese economic sectors, including the banking sector, started to make 
significant changes after the country adopted the liberalisation policy. As the Nepalese 
economy started to make structural shifts in economic activities, the Nepal Rastra Bank Act 
1955 became inconsistent (World Bank 2002). With financial liberalisation, for example, there 
was an increase in the number of banks operating in the country (Bank Supervision Department 
2002). These joint-venture banks came with new technologies and management knowledge 
(Bank Supervision Department 2002). The establishment of private banks brought changes in 
the business model of the Nepalese banking sector, particularly with the use of modern ICT in 
banking. The NRB Act 1955 was designed, however, for supervising and regulating state-
owned banks (World Bank 2002). Considering these structural changes in the banking sector, 
the legal framework governing the banking system, the NRB Act 1955, became obsolete 
(World Bank 2002). 
In June 1955, an assessment of Nepal’s compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision (BCPs) was conducted (World Bank 2002). The findings of this 
assessment concluded that the Rastra Bank had failed to comply fully with two-thirds of the 
BCPs (World Bank 2002). The results established that Nepal Rastra Bank was experiencing 
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difficulties in fulfilling its supervisory mandates (World Bank 2002). The findings also 
revealed that almost none of the preconditions required by the Basel Committee existed in 
Nepal (World Bank 2002). Some of these preconditions were inadequate legal frameworks, the 
nonexistence of the NRB’s operational independence, absence of a market-based banking 
business system, and inadequately strong internal structure (World Bank 2002). The findings 
from the World Bank (2002) implied that the NRB Act 1955 was inadequate for the NRB to 
execute its supervisory and regulatory functions. The authority granted to the NRB did not 
sufficiently permit it to supervise the financial sector adequately, and to facilitate the growth 
and improvement of the country’s financial infrastructure and market (World Bank 2002). The 
results of this assessment implied that the NRB Act 1955 had granted too little power to the 
Central Bank of Nepal. The 1955 assessment also revealed that the NRB Act 1955 was not 
suitable for a modern banking system (World Bank 2002). 
To address the weaknesses and inadequacies identified in the NRB Act 1955, the NRB issued 
seven new banking regulations in 2001 (World Bank 2002). According to the Bank Supervision 
Department (2002), this new set of regulations, NRB Regulations 2001, were based on the 
Core Principles of Bank Supervision of the 1988 Basel Accords published by BIS. The 
regulations were drafted and published with the consultative assistance of the World Bank, 
which consisted of Directives under seven headings (Bank Supervision Department 2002). 
These regulations covered capital adequacy, loan classification and provisioning, single obligor 
limit, accounting policies and financial statement, and corporate governance (Bank Supervision 
Department 2002). The Directives issued on corporate governance in mid-July 2001 prohibit 
banks from granting loans and advances to the bank’s promoters and directors (Bank 
Supervision Department 2002). One of the provisions in the Corporate Governance Directives 
was for banks to establish an internal audit committee under the chairpersonship of a non-
executive board member (Bank Supervision Department 2002). Thus, Nepal began to adopt 
the Basel Accord formally from 2001 to enhance business practices and address the risks of 
the banking business. 
While the revised regulations of 2001 sought to provide higher regulatory power to the Rastra 
Bank, by early 2002, the Rastra Bank was already encountering resistance to their 
implementation (World Bank 2002). Meaningful implementations of this revised regulation 
were thus a challenge for the Rastra Bank (World Bank 2002). Despite resistances and 
challenges, however, the new NRB Act 2002 was enacted in 2002, replacing the NRB Act 1955 
and Currency Act 1983 (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). The NRB Act 2002 refined the role of the 
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Central Bank in the economy (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018) and made the Rastra Bank more 
autonomous (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). The NRB Act 2002, for instance, gives full legal power 
and authority to the Rastra Bank to regulate the functions and activities of BFIs under the 
jurisdictions of NRB. To regulate the functions and activities of BFIs, the Rastra Bank can 
frame rules and Bylaws and can issue necessary orders, Directives and circulars to commercial 
banks and other financial institutions to make BFIs abide by these rules, Bylaws, Directives 
and circulars. As per the NRB Act 2002, the Rastra Bank can also seek to obtain detailed 
particulars, information, data, records and documents from BFIs for inspection and 
supervision. The NRB Act 2002 has entrusted the NRB with the legal power to conduct 
investigations or inspections of the books and accounts, documents or records of BFIs to 
determine whether or not BFIs are conducting their business under the NRB Act 2002, rules, 
Bylaws, Acts, Directives, circulars and orders. 
Later, on 14 November 2016, the NRB Act 2002 was further amended. The objective of this 
the 2016 NRB Act amendment was to make the NRB more efficient and effective within a 
changing context, with the focus being given to financial consolidation rather than financial 
expansion, and with priority accorded to financial access. According to Section 4 of the NRB 
Act 2002, second amendment 2016, the Central Bank’s objectives have also been revised. 
According to this revision of the NRB Act 2002, the NRB has three key objectives. The first 
objective is to formulate necessary monetary and foreign exchange policies to maintain 
stability in the price and balance of payment for economic stability and sustainable economic 
development. The second objective is to increase access to financial services and public 
confidence in the banking and financial system. The third objective is to develop a secure, 
healthy and efficient payment system. 
According to Nepal Rastra Bank (2018), separate Acts were governing separate institutions 
even until 2004. The Nepal Bank Limited and Rastriya Banjiya Bank Limited (RBB), for 
instance, had separate Acts for their institutions (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). The Banking and 
Financial Institution Ordinance 2004, however, became the first umbrella legislation to regulate 
and supervise all BFIs under single legislation (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). This ordinance 
unified the scattered legislations to harmonise banking practices (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). 
Later, this ordinance became the Bank and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) 2006. The 
BAFIA 2006 is based on international banking norms and standards (Acharya 2018). The 
BAFIA not only entrusted the NRB with more supervisory and enforcement power (Nepal 
Rastra Bank 2018) but also provided the NRB with legal authority to discipline BFIs by 
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enhancing corporate governance in the BFIs (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). The BAFIA 2017 has 
since provided the authority to impose a complete or partial ban on banking and financial 
transactions, suspension of boards of directors, and takeover by Central Bank for problematic 
commercial banks and financial institutions, as well as the cancellation of operating licences. 
For instance, BAFIA has given the NRB legal rights to suspend or revoke the banking licences 
of BFIs, if BFIs operate against the interests of depositors or violate the NRB Act, BAFIA, 
Bylaws or Directives. 
Nepal Rastra Bank (2018) states that the NRB issues prudential guidelines in the form of 
Directives to regulate activities that help to make the financial system sound, safe and stable. 
These Directives play a crucial role in maintaining the economy’s financial stability and helps 
to enhance public confidence in the financial system (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). Within the 
context of the financial sector reform process and rapidly changing financial conditions, the 
Rastra Bank’s objective and role have been changing to incorporate this changing financial 
landscape and need. The NRB Unified Directives have continued to date by amending and 
updating them with changing circumstances (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). For example, the NRB 
Directives were extended from seven headings in 2001 to 16 in 2006 (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). 
Likewise, in 2007, the NRB added Know Your Customer (KYC) and Credit Policy to the 
Unified Directives (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). Currently, there are 23 headings under the 
Unified Directives (Nepal Rastra Bank 2018). These revisions and amendments to the 
regulations indicate that the NRB has been revising its Acts and Directives to fit the features 
and needs of the Nepalese domestic market. 
4.2.3 What Standards for Risk Governance Are Adopted from the Basel Norms by the 
Nepal Rastra Bank and Used by the Nepalese Banking Sector 
As mentioned earlier, under the NRB Act 2002 and BAFIA 2017, the NRB has been regulating 
and supervising BFIs in Nepal through various Directives and regulations. The structure for 
the risk governance mechanism of the banks is covered in Sections 60 and 61 under BAFIA 
2017 and the Terms of Reference (ToR) in Unified Directives 2075 under the Nepal Rastra 
Bank Act 2002. Similarly, the Basel Principles, such as Principles 3 and 6 of Corporate 
Governance Principles for Banks, contain guidelines for the risk governance structure of an 
internationally active bank (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). These 
aforementioned Basel Principles, Acts and Directives have therefore been used to analyse the 
risk governance of the Nepalese banking industry. 
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“Principle 3” outlines the guiding principles for the Board’s structure and practices for an 
appropriate risk governance mechanism (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). 
This principle states that, depending on several factors such as a bank’s size, Board’s size, 
business nature and risk profile, the board can mandate to establish specialised board sub-
committees (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). Such board sub-committees can 
assist the board to have an in-depth and greater focus on particular areas wherever necessary 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015). As per the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2015), board sub-committees can help to increase the board’s efficiency and 
functioning. Some of the board-level committees mentioned by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2015), which look after risk management issues, are audit and risk 
management committees. Each committee should have a charter or other instrument that sets 
out its mandate, scope and working procedures (Bank for International Settlements 2015, 
p. 16). 
Conversely, as per Section 60 of BAFIA 2017, the Nepal Rastra Bank mandates that 
commercial banks should establish a board-level audit committee to look after risk 
management. Similarly, Section 61 of BAFIA 2017 specifies the functions, duties and power 
of a bank’s audit committee. As per the ToR in the Unified Directives 2075 under the Nepal 
Rastra Bank Act 2002, the commercial banks should establish a board-level risk management 
committee (Bank and Financial Institutions Regulation Department 2018).  
4.2.3.1 Risk Governance at Board Level 
From the above section, it is clear that both the Basel Committee and Rastra Bank have required 
banks to establish audit and risk management committees in their banks. The following section 
explains the major differences and similarities of each of these board sub-committees as per 
the Basel and NRB. 
4.2.3.1.1 Audit Committee 
Appendix 4-1 summarises the audit committee’s mandate as per the Basel and NRB. It provides 
a snapshot of how a banking audit committee should be structured and functioned as per Basel 
recommendations and NRB requirements. Appendix 4-1 shows that, while the NRB’s 
regulatory requirements are similar to the Basel recommendations, there is a significant 
difference in the mandates provided to the audit committee. While both the Basel and NRB, 
for example, have mandated banks to establish an audit committee, in the case of the audit 
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committee’s chairperson, the Basel Committee has specified that non-executive Director 
should chair this committee. The Basel Committee specifies that the chairperson of the board 
or any other board sub-committees should not head the audit committee, while the NRB states 
that neither a bank’s chairperson, chairperson of other board sub-committees, nor CEO of the 
bank, should chair the audit committee. 
Some other notable differences can be observed in the formation of the audit committee. There 
are also key differences in the audit committee’s composition and committee members’ 
experience. For instance, the Basel Committee does not specify the exact number of members 
who should participate in the audit committee. The Basel Committee also states that members 
of the audit committee should have experience in audit practices, financial reporting and 
accounting. Conversely, while the NRB states that the audit committee should comprise of 
three members, it is silent in terms of the experience of the audit committee’s members. 
Likewise, while the Basel guideline does not specify how often the audit committee should 
meet, as per the NRB requirements, the audit committee meeting should usually be held once 
every three months. 
In summary, the comparison criteria of the audit committee’s mandate relate to its existence, 
composition and reporting line, and the number of meetings conducted by the audit committee. 
Analysing the power, functions and duties of the audit committee is equally important to 
understand the functioning of the audit committee. Therefore, these parameters are compared 
and analysed in this project. Appendix 4-2 summarises the responsibilities and authorities of 
the audit committee for both the Basel Committee and Rastra Bank. 
Referring to Appendix 4-2, it can be observed that, compared to the Basel Committee’s 
guidelines, the NRB has a narrow focus and scope of the audit committee’s duties and 
functions. According to the Basel Committee, banks are recommended to make their audit 
committee responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, as well as for ensuring 
that senior management is taking necessary corrective actions on a timely basis to address 
weaknesses, problems and non-compliance with policies, laws and regulations, and other issues 
identified by auditors and other control functions. The Basel Committee has also recommended 
that the audit committee should have the authority to approve or recommend the board as to 
the approval, appointment, remuneration and dismissal of external auditors. Likewise, as per 
the Basel Committee, the bank’s audit committee is responsible for reviewing third-party 
opinions about the design and effectiveness of the bank’s overall risk governance framework 
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and internal control system. Similarly, as per the Basel Committee, the audit committee is 
responsible for reviewing and approving the audit scope and frequency. 
According to the NRB, however, apart from ensuring that the bank’s books of records were 
prepared according to the prevailing laws, regulations and Directives of the Rastra Bank, the 
audit committees are also accountable for providing opinions on other areas as required by the 
board. As per the NRB, the audit committee is responsible for recommending the three names 
of external auditors. The audit committees of commercial banks in Nepal are also required to 
monitor and audit the bank’s management and operation, then to provide a report to the board 
on the status of the BFI’s performance and compliance to the applicable Acts, Rules, Bylaws, 
policies and specified Directives. These audit committee functions indicate that the audit 
committee is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of reports and compliance with applicable 
Acts, Rules, Bylaws, policies and specified directives of BFIs. In all, comparing the audit 
committee’s functions as per the NRB requirements with the Basel Committee’s 
recommendations shows that the audit committee’s scope of operation in the Nepalese banking 
sector is limited. 
4.2.3.1.2 Risk Management Committee 
Similar to the audit committee, the recommendations for the risk management committee is 
discussed in Principle 3 of Corporate Governance Principles for Banks. Through “Principle 
3”, the Basel Committee explicitly provides details on how the risk management committee 
should be chartered, along with its mandate, scope and working procedures. The Nepal Rastra 
Bank provides guidelines for the Risk Management Committee’s functioning through the ToR 
in the Unified Directives 2075, which was issued under the Nepal Rastra Bank Act 2002. 
Appendix 4-3 provides a summary on how the risk management committee in BFIs should be 
established and function as per the Basel Principles and NRB requirements. Like in the 
previous investigation of the audit committee’s mandates, the RMC’s mandates have been 
further investigated as to its existence, composition, reporting line and the number of meetings 
conducted by the RMC. 
Appendix 4-3 shows that, while the RMC’s mandates as per the NRB’s regulatory requirements 
are relatively similar to the Basel recommendations, there is a major difference in the mandates 
provided to this committee. For example, both the Basel and NRB mandate banks to establish 
an RMC. In terms of the RMC chairperson, however, the Basel Committee specifies that non-
executive Director should chair this committee and that the RMC chairperson should not also 
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be the chairperson of either the board or any other board sub-committees. Conversely, the NRB 
states that the RMC chairperson should be a non-executive director. 
Some of the notable differences observed in the formation of the RMC relate to the number of 
members in the committee, and their experience. For instance, while the Basel Committee does 
not specify the exact number of members who should be in the RMC, it states that most RMC 
members should be independent, who have experience in risk management issues and 
practices. The NRB specifies that the Head of the Operations Department should be a member 
of the RMC. Likewise, the Head of the Credit Department or Head of a separate unit looking 
after risk management, if any, should be its member secretary. While the Basel guideline does 
not specify how often the RMC should meet, as per the NRB requirements, the RMC meeting 
should typically be held once every three months. 
In summary, the comparison criteria of the RMC’s mandates relate to its existence, composition 
and reporting line, and the number of meetings conducted by the RMC. However, analysing 
the power, functions and duties of the RMC is also equally important to understand the 
functioning of the RMC. Therefore, this project has compared and analysed these parameters. 
The responsibilities and authorities of the risk management committee are outlined in 
“Principle 3” of the Basel Committee’s Corporate Governance Principles for Banks and the 
ToR in the Unified Directives 2075 under Nepal Rastra Bank Act 2002. Appendix 4-4 
summarises the responsibilities and authorities of the RMC as per both the Basel Committee 
and Rastra Bank. From Appendix 4-4, it can be observed that similar to the audit committee's 
functioning, the RMC has a limited scope of operation when the guidelines from the NRB are 
compared with the Basel Committee recommendations. 
4.2.3.2 Risk Governance at Senior Management Level 
Chapter 2 illustrated that senior management should be part of the risk governance of banks 
because the risk management function acts as a second line of defence. Here, the risk 
governance at the senior management level is analysed against both the Basel and NRB. 
4.2.3.2.1 Establishment of an independent risk management function and 
appointment of Chief Risk Officer 
The Basel Accords and NRB have recognised the risk management function as the key 
component in a bank’s second line of defence. Appendix 4-5 summarises the mandates of the 
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risk management function and CRO. As outlined in Appendix 4-5, both the Basel and NRB 
require banks to form their risk management function under a CRO. The Basel Committee 
recommends establishing a risk management function that is independent of other business and 
operation units. The Basel Committee also specifies that the risk management function should 
have the authority to oversee the enterprise-wide risk management activities of the bank. As 
per the Basel Standards, for example, the head of risk management functions should be 
managed by a senior manager, or equivalent to senior manager, with a functional title such as 
CRO. Similar to the Basel recommendations, the Rastra Bank requires commercial banks to 
establish a risk management unit and to appoint a CRO, or equivalent, to act as the head of this 
unit. The Basel Committee further elaborates the function of the CRO by stating that the 
appointment, dismissal or any other changes regarding the CRO’s position, such as his/her 
compensation and performance, should be reviewed and approved by the board or board risk 
committee. The Basel Accords require banks to discuss with their supervisory body the reason 
for a CRO’s dismissal. The Basel guidelines also require banks to disclose the information of 
such removal publicly. The Basel Committee outlines other aspects of the CRO, such as his/her 
authority, power and independence. 
In the context of the Nepalese banking industry, however, the NRB does not mandate that 
banks should discuss the dismissal of a CRO with their supervisory body. Likewise, the NRB 
does not specify any requirement to disclose the information regarding the CRO’s removal 
publicly. The NRB only specifies that the Board, or its RMC, should review the CRO’s 
performance. 
Further, the Basel Committee states that a bank’s CRO should have the necessary skills and 
organisational stature and authority to manage the bank’s risk activities. To illustrate this point, 
the CRO should have sufficient independence, access to any required information without any 
impediment, and a direct line of access or report to the board or board risk committee. The 
Basel Committee also recommends that this risk management function should be sufficiently 
distinct from other functional units. The Basel Principles state that, when ‘dual hatting’ is 
inevitable, in such case, the CROs’ independent functioning should be ensured. For example, 
the CRO should not be involved in revenue generation, hold line responsibility or participate 
in business decision-making or the approval process. The NRB specifies the exact requirements 
for the independent functioning of the CRO. When comparing other aspects of the Basel and 
NRB’s mandates, however, in terms of risk governance at senior management level, the NRB 
lacks focus on crucial aspects regarding the CRO’s compensation and dismissal. 
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4.3 Stage 2 Analysis: Exploration of Nepalese Commercial Banks’ 
Compliance to Risk Governance Mandates 
Section 4.2.3, above, discussed several standards that have been adopted by the Nepal Rastra 
Bank for the risk governance of the Nepalese banking sector. This section investigates the 
commercial banks’ compliance with national regulatory requirements on risk governance 
mechanisms, as identified in Section 4.2.3. This analysis will help to investigate if whether the 
sample banks have similar or distinct mechanisms for the set-up and function of the risk 
governance mechanism in their respective banks. 
4.3.1 Risk Governance at Board Level 
This section discusses compliance with the different mandates specified by the Rastra Bank for 
the functioning of both the audit and risk management committees. 
4.3.1.1 Audit Committee 
This section investigates the practices of the sample banks, in terms of compliance or non-
compliance to the different mandates given to the audit committee’s functioning by the Rastra 
Bank. From Appendix 4-6, it can be concluded that all the banks have conformed with the 
mandates of the establishing the audit committee in their banks. Appendix 4-6 also shows that, 
apart from for EBL for FY 2015/2016, and FY 2016/2017, all of the sample banks over the 
study period complied with the Rastra Bank’s other mandates for the RMC’s functioning. 
While going through the annual reports of the sample banks, some data discrepancies were 
detected. In their annual reports, SRBL and CTZN have some data inaccuracies in their 
reporting of the statistics for the number of audit meetings conducted. To illustrate this point, 
in the Citizen International Bank Limited’s annual report of FY 2015/2016, page 44 mentions 
there being 15 audit committee meetings. In contrast, on page 98 for the same fiscal year, the 
audit committee meeting is stated as being held 16 times. 
Similarly, there is inconsistent information in SRBL’s  annual reports of FY 2015/2016 and 
FY 2016/2017, regarding the number of times the audit meeting was conducted. Pages 37 and 
69 of SRBL’s annual report of FY 2015/2016 mentions that five audit committee meetings 
were held in that year. Page 68, however, mentions that the audit committee meeting was held 
nine times during the review period. In SRBL’s annual report FY 2016/2017, rather than the 
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exact number of meetings held, it states that the audit committee met the regulatory 
requirement. All this information reveals that there is not the only variation in how many times 
the sample banks conducted their audit meetings, but also there are inaccuracies in the 
information they have furnished. 
As per Section 60 subclass (4) of BAFIA 2017, commercial banks are required to conduct their 
Audit Committee at least once per quarter. Therefore, this project attempted to discover if all 
sample banks fulfilled this mandate. From the annual reports of the sample banks, it can be 
observed that only the CTZN furnished the details of each meeting. SRBL and SCB have not 
provided details regarding the duration of each meeting. With this lack of information, 
therefore, it cannot be determined if banks were conforming to the Rastra Bank’s frequency 
for the audit committee's meetings. However, CTZN has complied with the regulatory 
requirement throughout the sample period. 
In term of the audit committee’s chairperson, this project has found that, in all the sample 
banks, the coordinator of the audit committee was a non-executive director, except for EBL 
from FY 2015/2016 to FY 2016/2017. Further, it was noted that the banks’ chairperson in the 
audit committee, as mentioned earlier, was not serving in the same capacity for other 
committees. The project found that the audit committees’ coordinators were also members of 
the RMC. Therefore, except for EBL from FY 2015/2016 to FY 2016/2017, all other sample 
banks appeared to be complying with the requirement of the audit committee’s chairperson. 
Regarding the Secretary of the audit committee, it was observed that, among the sample banks, 
SRBLhad a different practice of appointing the secretary of the audit committee. For example, 
from FY 2015/2016 to FY 2016/2017, it was observed that the bank’s Company Secretary was 
the member secretary of the audit committee. Only in FY 2017/2018 did the CRO serve as the 
member secretary of the audit committee. For the remaining sample banks, the head of the 
internal audit department attended the meeting as the member secretary of the audit committee. 
These practices illustrate that the sample banks varied in terms of who acts as the member 
secretary of the audit committee. 
4.3.1.2 Risk Management Committee 
Similar to the investigation of the audit committee in Section 4.3.1.1, above, this section 
presents the findings on the sample banks’ compliance or non-compliance to the Rastra Bank’s 
mandates regarding the functioning of the risk management committee. From Appendix 4-7, it 
can be concluded that the banks have all conformed with the mandates of establishing an RMC 
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in their banks. It can also be concluded that, apart from for EBL for FY 2015/2016 and 
FY 2016/2017, all the sample banks over the study period have complied with the mandates of 
the Rastra Bank for the RMC’s functioning. 
Similar to the Audit Committee requirement, commercial banks are required to conduct their 
RMC meeting at least once per quarter. Therefore, this project attempted to discover if all the 
sample banks fulfilled this mandate. From the sample banks’ annual reports, it can be observed 
that only CTZN furnished the details of each meeting. SRBL and SCB did not provide details 
regarding the duration of each meeting. With this lack of information, therefore, it cannot be 
determined whether those meetings were held at each quarter. However, CTZN complied with 
the regulatory requirement throughout the sample period. 
4.3.2 Risk Governance at Senior Management Level 
Section 4.2.3.2, above, discussed various risk governance mandates, which are recommended 
by the Basel and NRB at senior management level for their risk governance role. The following 
section investigates the practices of the sample banks in complying with the mandates required 
by the Rastra Bank at senior management level. 
By analysing Appendix 4-8, it can be observed that, except for EBL, the remaining sample 
banks provided information regarding the existence of both a risk management unit and CRO. 
The data from CTZN and SRBL reveal that their risk management department was established 
during the sample period. In the case of SCB, while it did not mention the existence of its risk 
management unit, it has had a CRO appointed since FY 2015/2016. Thus, SCB has had risk 
management function in its bank since this time. From Appendix 4-8, it can be seen that the 
Officiating Head, Head of the risk management department and Chief Risk Management 
Officer headed the risk management functions. 
Regarding the CRO’s reporting line, apart from CTZN, none of the other sample banks 
provided sufficient information. Due to lack of sufficient information available in sample 
banks’ annual reports, it could not also be concluded whether or not the CRO was functioning 
independently. Throughout the sample period, however, CTZN had an independent CRO. The 
independency of the CRO at CTZN was illustrated through his/her direct reporting to the Risk 
Management Committee. 
Regarding the practice of the CRO’s ‘dual hatting’ in the sample banks, this dual hatting varied 
across the study period for the sample banks. For example, in FY 2016/2017, while some banks 
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mentioned that their CRO had a dual role, others stated that they did not have a CRO with a 
dual role. The other role assigned to the CRO also varied across the sample banks. For example, 
the CRO of SCB had the additional responsibilities of being Senior Credit Officer throughout 
the sample period. Similarly, while CTZN’s CRO had no additional role till FY 2016/2017, 
he/she had been assigned the role of Recovery Officer in FY 2017/2018. Likewise, the CRO 
of SRBL handled the additional role of Company Secretary in FY 2016/2017. 
4.4 Overall Observations on the Governance Mechanisms in the Nepalese 
Banking Sector 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), Principles 3 and 6 of  
Corporate Governance Principles for Banks contain guidelines for the risk governance 
structure of an internationally active bank. Pelzer (2013) views that the Basel Accords outline 
the regulatory guidelines for banking operation and risk management, particularly for an 
internationally active bank. However, as discussed earlier, the Basel Norms are considered to 
be the best international benchmark for banking regulations to build a resilient banking system 
(Ljubić, Pavlović & Milančić 2015). Becoming Basel-compliant is, however, not an easy task 
for developing economies (Boora & Kavita 2018). Boora and Kavita (2018) view that many of 
the protocols recommended in the Basel Norms are not readily fully applicable to developing 
or less-developed countries. For example, while the Basel Committee has recommended that 
banks should use an advanced approach for capital fund calculation, as shown in Appendix 4-
9, it is not applicable in the Nepalese banking context. Due to various constraints, such as the 
lack of credit rating practices, the Nepalese banking sector is not in a position to apply this 
Basel’s advanced approaches (Nepal Rastra Bank 2013; Uprety 2013). As such, the Nepal 
Rastra Bank has prescribed the simplest of the available approaches (Nepal Rastra Bank 2013, 
2015a) such as Simplified Standardized Approach for credit risk, Basic Indicator Approach for 
operational risk and Net Open Position Approach for market risk (Nepal Rastra Bank 2013; 
Uprety 2013). 
Similarly, developing countries also face certain constraints for practising sound corporate 
governance. One of the constraints that developing economies come across is that they have 
insufficient institutional memories, experiences and expertise compared to those of advanced 
economies, which nurture sound corporate governance practices (McGee 2010). From this 
argument, it follows that, for developing nations such as Nepal, these constraints hinder the 
practice of robust corporate governance mechanisms. More importantly, the Nepalese banking 
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sector does not have adequate infrastructure, such as strong information technology, robust 
MIS and competent human skills (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019; Uprety 2013), 
which are essential for robust risk governance practices. These insufficient infrastructures are 
challenging for implementing the risk governance mechanism in the Nepalese banking sector.  
Likewise, Section 4.3 demonstrates that the Nepalese banking industry is steadily improving 
its risk governance practices and disclosures on risk governance. There is a lack of adequate 
information from the banks’ annual reports and non-disclosures from the regulator on 
compliance with risk governance. The information furnished by the Nepal Rastra Bank for its 
enforcement actions contains only information relating to monetary penalties for breaches of 
prudential regulatory measures, such as failing to maintain the capital adequacy ratio, cash 
reserve ratio, statutory liquidity ratio and deprived sector lending. These punitive courses of 
action from the Rastra Bank show that the Rastra Bank is disciplining poor business practice 
and pursuing compliance. However, there is no information furnished on the breaches for risk 
governance mechanism for both the board and senior management levels. For example, there 
is no information provided regarding whether or not commercial banks are fulfilling the 
mandates outlined in the above section regarding audit committees, risk management 
committees or senior management. Furthermore, there is no information disclosed regarding 
the enforcement action undertaken by the NRB for breaches of regulatory risk governance 
mechanism. 
This non-disclosure illustrates that the Nepal Rastra Bank is practising selective disclosure on 
enforcement actions for the risk governance mechanism. With this insufficient or lack of the 
information, it difficult to conclude the sample banks’ compliance status to the NRB mandates. 
This selective non-disclosure on the Rastra Bank’s enforcement action for the risk governance 
mechanism might indicate, however, that the Rastra Bank is pursuing an educative approach 
towards compliance. The lack of information in compliance enforcement can be justified with 
the challenges identified by the Rastra Bank in implementing the Basel III. The following 
section briefly explains the problems identified by the NRB. 
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4.5 Challenges Identified in the Implementations in Basel III In Nepalese 
Commercial Banks 
Complying with the Basel Norms is not an easy task. The country, banking regulator and the 
banking institutions of Nepal face several challenges in implementing the Basel Norms. Some 
of the key challenges identified in implementing the Basel III are discussed below. 
4.5.1 Lapses in the Effective Supervisory Practices of the Rastra Bank 
As noted earlier, the NRB is responsible for the supervision and regulation of BFIs in Nepal. 
The NRB has established four different supervision departments, including Bank Supervision, 
Development Bank Supervision, Finance Company Supervision, and Micro Finance Promotion 
and Supervision Departments, to supervise each class of BFIs under its jurisdiction (Bank 
Supervision Department 2018). Arrangements have been made so that each department 
supervises its respective class of banks to make supervision more effective (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018). The Bank Supervision Department mainly conducts supervision of the 
commercial banks of Nepal through onsite inspection and offsite surveillance (Bank 
Supervision Department 2014, 2017, 2019). The Bank Supervision Department comprises the 
Onsite Inspection, Enforcement, Offsite, Policy Planning and Analysis, Special Inspection, and 
Internal Administration units (Bank Supervision Department 2019). Bank supervision aims at 
examining the risks that commercial banks face and their ability to manage those risks (Bank 
Supervision Department 2012, 2019). Likewise, during these supervision and inspections, the 
department reviews for compliance with regulatory requirements such as Acts, rules and 
regulations, as well as adherence to the banks’ own internal policies, procedures, manuals and 
guidelines (Bank Supervision Department 2019). 
It is essential to enforce supervisory directions effectively. The supervisory enforcement 
function is vital to ensure that banks are complying with the regulatory requirements and their 
own internal policies and procedures (Bank Supervision Department 2019). Falling under the 
Bank Supervision Department, the Enforcement Unit is responsible for the proper enforcement 
of such supervisory directions (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). It has been found, 
however, that supervisory instructions are not enforced effectively (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018, 2019). For instance, on completion of their onsite inspections, the Bank 
Supervision Department prepares reports and provides directions to the individual banks to 
make corrections on the issues identified (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). 
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However, banks habitually find excuses and do not take corrective measures on time (Bank 
Supervision Department 2018, 2019). Banks also commit to making rectifications at some later 
date (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). Due to the limited supervisory resources, 
however, follow-up on all the commitments made by the banks has been a challenge for the 
department (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). Ensuring appropriate corrections 
measures are made on time has also become a challenge for the Enforcement Unit due to 
constraints on supervisory resources (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). 
The prudential policies adopted, such as onsite inspections and offsite surveillance, are 
supervisory practices based on the best international norms (Bank Supervision Department 
2019). It has been found, however, that there is inadequate integration between the Onsite and 
Offsite units (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). The reports that the Offsite Unit 
receives from the banks is an important source of input for onsite inspection (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018). Still, the Offsite Unit’s inputs are not considered when developing the 
bank’s risk profile (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). Likewise, the onsite 
inspections also do not adequately scrutinise the data integrity of the regulatory reports that are 
sent to the Offsite Unit (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). The inadequate integration 
between the Onsite and Offsite units also illustrates that the Nepal Rastra Bank does not have 
an effective supervisory process in place. Similarly, offsite analysts and onsite inspectors may 
perform the same analysis (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). These practices show 
that there are redundancies in the supervisory functions of the Rastra Bank (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018, 2019). These weaknesses in supervisory functions show that the Rastra Bank 
is facing challenges to integrate their Onsite and Offsite units fully, which are hindering their 
supervisory directions and, ultimately, effective enforcement actions (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018, 2019). 
4.5.2 A Dearth of Human Resources Expertise 
Human resources competencies have remained a challenge for the Nepalese banking industry. 
The quality of human resources in the banking industry, and the capacity of banking 
supervisors, have remained as challenges in the Nepalese banking industry. With the 
development of new products and services, and adoption of advanced ICT, the Nepalese 
banking industry is continuously evolving and becoming more complicated (Bank Supervision 
Department 2019; Nepal Rastra Bank 2013, 2015a). The adaptation of international best 
practices and national prudential regulatory standards, such as the Basel Norms, in risk 
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management and corporate governance are placing demands for a more competent skillset and 
stricter compliance in the banking industry (Bank Supervision Department 2015, 2016, 2017, 
2018, 2019). However, in almost every onsite inspection and supervision, a dearth of skilled 
and competent human resources was found in the banking industry (Bank Supervision 
Department 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). The recent mergers in the banking industry are 
likely to slash down skilled and competent human resources, mainly from senior management 
level (Banking Khabar 2019). With more mergers likely to happen in the future, retaining 
competent human resources in Nepal’s banking sector will be more challenging. 
Banks operate both nationally and internationally. Therefore, there is a need for understanding 
rapidly changing financial markets. After the GFC of 2008, especially, supervisors worldwide 
agreed that there is a need for understanding these rapidly evolving financial markets (Bank 
Supervision Department 2014). Supervisors also need to understand the risks that new products 
and services bring with them (Bank Supervision Department 2014). Accordingly, the Nepal 
Rastra Bank and Bank Supervision Department have made many efforts and channelled 
resources to enhance the capacity of supervisors and to bring shared understanding on financial 
issues (Bank Supervision Department 2014). The Rastra Bank and Bank Supervision 
Department have continuously pursued various trainings, seminars, knowledge sharing and 
interaction programs (Bank Supervision Department 2014). These programs, conducted both 
domestically and abroad, have helped NRB Supervisors to bring a common understanding of 
the changing business environment, as well as to equip them with the necessary resources for 
effective regulation and supervision (Bank Supervision Department 2014). The effective 
supervision has, however, become one the major challenge for the Rastra Bank (Risal and Panta 
2019) with the NRB’s limited supervisory resources and capacity, and the increasing number 
of BFIs (Bank Supervision Department 2019).  
The skills development and resources needed for adapting their supervisory approaches to these 
continuous changes have also been a constant challenge to the NRB (Bank Supervision 
Department 2019). For instance, although the Rastra Bank had implemented risk-based 
supervision (RBS) as the parallel run in FY 2013/2014 (Bank Supervision Department 2016, 
2017; Nepal Rastra Bank 2015a), since FY 2014/2015, the Rastra Bank has changed their 
onsite inspection model from compliance-based to  RBS (Bank Supervision Department 2016; 
Nepal Rastra Bank 2015a). Under the RBS approach, the supervisors should not only identify 
but also appropriately assess the quantity of risk and quality of risk management for all major 
risks that banks face (Bank Supervision Department 2018, 2019). There is a challenge for 
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supervisors; however, to assess those levels based on the issues identified (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018, 2019). The Bank Supervision Department (2018) further claims that not all 
supervisors have adequate knowledge and skills to perform their job effectively. NRB 
supervisors are not adequately experienced to apply the RBS approach effectively (Bank 
Supervision Department 2018, 2019).  The findings from this project are consistent with the 
claim that the supervisory capacity has not increased in proportion to the complexity of 
the new banking regulations (Anginer et al. 2019). Thus, skills and capacity development, 
in term of human resources for both the banking industry and NRB supervisors, can become a 
challenge for implementing international best practices better. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings and a discussion of the Nepalese commercial banks’ 
risk governance practices. Notably, by applying public interest theory and agency theory, the 
Nepal Rastra Bank was found to be committed to implementing the Basel Norms in commercial 
banks for the best interests of broader stakeholders even though none of the Nepalese banks 
meets the requirements for being systemically important global bank (Nepal Rastra Bank 
2013). The various risk governance mechanisms that the NRB had adapted from the Basel 
Accords for the Nepalese banking sector have attempted to make the banks’ senior 
management and boards accountable for their banks’ risk management. These therories were 
useful, therefore, to understand that the risk governance mechanism implemented in the 
Nepalese banking system, ultimately, would enable the interests of the broader stakeholders to 
be protected. This chapter also provided evidence that all the sample banks have audit and risk 
management committees at their board level. The following chapter presents the conclusion of 
this thesis project.
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CHAPTER  5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This research project’s objective was to describe and explain the risk governance practices of 
the Nepalese commercial banks, relating to the adoption of Basel’s corporate governance 
principles. This final chapter aims to present the conclusions of the project and provide 
recommendations. It summarises this project’s key findings and discusses their implications. 
This chapter also explains the project’s limitations and areas for future research. Section 5.2 
presents a summary of this research project’s key findings. Section 5.3 elaborates with the 
implications of the project’s findings. Similarly, the contribution of this project to the body of 
research, in terms of the risk governance practices of Nepalese commercial banks, is discussed 
in Section 5.4. The limitations of this project is explained in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes 
this chapter by presenting recommendations for future research on risk governance. 
5.2 Key Findings of the Project 
The primary objective of this project was to gain an in-depth understanding of risk governance 
practices of the commercial banks of Nepal. Research questions were formulated in Chapter 1 
and data were analysed in Chapter 4 to achieve this objective. From this project, it can be 
concluded that Nepal and the NRB are introducing and amending the Acts, legislations and 
regulations as discussed in Section 4.2, to embrace the international best practices. For instance, 
the NRB’s regulatory mandates in Section 4.2.3, illustrate that the NRB is creating the 
responsibilities and accountabilities for a risk oversight function to improve the risk 
governance practices in the banking sector. From these Nepal Rastra Bank’s initiatives, it can 
be concluded that the NRB has undoubtedly made progress in improving the resilience in the 
banking sector of Nepal. The project’s findings are consistent with the earlier studies that have 
found that the new regulatory frameworks and amendments in the existing legislation have 
helped in bringing the improvements in risk governance to some extent in the banking industry 
of Nepal (Luintel, Selim & Bajracharya 2014; Ozaki 2014; Shrestha 2004). These findings can 
also be related to the claim that the NRB is promoting corporate governance; accountability of 
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management and board of directors; and risk management (Bank Supervision Department 
2018). 
The findings also indicate that on the one hand, while some of the sample banks are complying 
to the NRB’s risk governance mechanisms. On the other hand, some sample banks have not 
sufficiently disclosed the risk governance information to conclude their compliance or non-
compliance to the NRB’s mandates. Similarly, the Rastra Bank has also not disclosed the 
information on the non-compliance and the enforcement action related to the risk governance 
mechanism. In this context, there is no sufficient evidence to conclude their compliance or non-
compliance to the NRB’s mandates. Thus, this evidence indicates that both the NRB and the 
bank doe not provide a clear and real picture of the actual risk governance mechanism. These 
findings are relatable to the findings of Buckby, Gallery and Ma (2015) that pointed out that 
disclosures about the risk governance, particularly about the risk management activities are 
either inaccurate or inadequate.  However, this research finding indicates that the Nepalese 
banks are in the process of developing their risk management practices and risk management 
information disclosures. For instance, during the study period FY2015/2016, not all sample 
banks have disclosed all the risk governance mandates in their annual reports. However, in 
FY2017/2018, all of the sample banks have disclosed at least most of their risk governance 
mechanisms. 
In conclusion, there is evidence to support that much work has been done in improving the risk 
governance practices of the Nepalese banking sector.  However, it is also important to note that 
building an effective risk governance mechanism is endless. Both the NRB and the commercial 
banks have still a lot more to do to build an effective risk governance mechanism. 
5.3 Implications of the Project’s Findings 
As noted earlier, the NRB and the banks have much work to be done in building robust risk 
governance mechanisms. The project has found that there is a lack of sufficient risk 
management disclosures from both the NRB and commercial banks to confirm compliance 
with the regulatory requirements. This limited information implies that the Rastra Bank and 
banks should also make their risk management information more accurate, consistent, 
transparent, meaningful and useful. The Rastra Bank should immediately start to strengthen its 
supervisory function to both monitor and adjust the appropriate disclosure mechanism ( Nepal 
Rastra Bank 2013). In this context, the Rastra Bank should seek to understand if banks need 
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any support in the form of technical, educational or other assistance to disclose the risk 
governance compliance to the regulatory mandates. For instance, the Rastra Banks needs to 
understand and decide whether there is a need for more clarity in regulation for the disclosure 
requirements for risk management information. Whether or not the Rastra Bank has to be more 
prescriptive in the risk information disclosure requirements of the banks.  Likewise, it is also 
essential for the Rastra Bank to identify if there should be any preferred regulatory disclosure 
method to implement in the Nepalese banking industry. This understanding and decision are 
necessary, as communication about how risk management is practised and disclosed to the 
stakeholders by an organisation is one of the essential components in corporate governance 
(Buckby, Gallery & Ma 2015). These risk information are also increasingly sought by the 
stakeholders such as investors and regulators (Buckby, Gallery & Ma 2015).  Thus, the Rastra 
Bank should immediately start to find the appropriate disclosure mechanism to ensure the 
enhanced corporate governance are practised, which is essential for financial safety and 
soundness. 
5.4 Contributions of the Project 
Upon its completion, this project has filled the research gap identified in Chapter 1. By filling 
this research gap, this research project has contributed to two areas. First, this project has made 
a contribution to the existing literature in the field of risk governance. More specifically, this 
contribution to the field has been made through two aspects. As discussed in Chapter 1, by 
investigating the risk governance mechanisms within a different context, which is the Nepalese 
context in this project has contributed to the field of risk governance. This project has filled the 
gap identified by McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013); Yusof (2016); and Zattoni, Douglas 
and Judge (2013). The project has also made a methodological contribution to the risk 
governance field by using the qualitative research approach. As stated in Chapter 1, there is 
need for qualitative research studies in the corporate governance field (McNulty, Zattoni & 
Douglas 2013; Yasin, Muhamad & Sulaiman 2014; Zattoni, Douglas & Judge 2013). These 
arguments demonstrate that, by using a qualitative research approach, this project has helped 
to bridge the research gap in understanding concepts of corporate governance and risk 
management, principles and frameworks, and their application status in the Nepalese banking 
industry. This research project has thus contributed to the existing literature on risk 
management and corporate governance through its context and methodological approach. 
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The second area of contribution is to policy debates. The findings from this project have 
revealed that both the NRB and the banks do not provide a clear and real picture of the actual 
risk governance mechanism. Thus, stakeholders such as individual banks, banking 
associations, regulators, investors and policymakers should challenge accuracies, 
meaningfulness and usefulness of the current risk information disclosures mechanism of the 
banks and the NRB. Similarly, as noted earlier, with the consolidation process adopted by the 
NRB through the merger and acquisition policy, and the increase in paid-up capital 
requirements, should bring structural changes to the banking system. The gradual entrance of 
foreign banks into the Nepalese financial system would expand and diversify the country’s 
banking structure. With the Rastra Bank’s provisioning to expand BFIs’ scope of operations 
by mandatory issuance of debentures and permission to accept deposits and borrowing from 
foreign currency sources expose BFIs to face more risks. In such a context, stakeholders should 
challenge the existing risk governance framework. These stakeholders should also question 
whether or not the existing regulatory risk management mechanisms are flexible and sufficient 
for adjusting to future banking challenges. 
5.5 Limitations of the Project 
There are several limitations to this project. One of the major limitations is that the findings on 
the risk governance mechanism practices observed in the sample banks may not be replicable 
in other commercial banks of Nepal. Because this project applied the convenience sampling 
method to collect the data on risk governance mechanism, the findings do not necessarily apply 
to all classes of commercial banks in Nepal. In addition, because this project is exploratory 
research, which sampled only four banks, caution should be applied when generalising the 
findings from this project. 
The second limitation is the project’s application of a limited theoretical lens. As observed in 
Chapter 2, numerous theoretical frameworks can be applied to understand risk governance 
issues. This project, however, applied just two theories. Because the use of agency theory has 
been criticised for being overly narrow (Ahrens, Filatotchev & Thomsen 2011), this project 
findings could be criticised for not using contemporary theories of corporate governance. Thus, 
the inadequate application of appropriate theories could be another limitation of this project. 
As discussed earlier, risk management is multi-dimensional. Some of the crucial facets 
identified with risk management are the bank’s risk culture, risk appetite, risk profile, risk 
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strategy, management information system (MIS) and risk governance (Bank Supervision 
Department 2018; Sheedy & Griffin 2018); the CRO’s remuneration; and qualifications and 
experience of the Audit and Risk Management committees (Sheedy & Griffin 2018). 
Integrating all these dimensions can help to gain a holistic and in-depth knowledge of the risk 
governance system. This project, however, has focused only on the existence of an active 
board, board sub-committee and senior management oversight in the organisational structure. 
Therefore, the use of this single dimension – risk governance – could be another limitation of 
this project. Given the resource’s availability, such as the research study period and word 
limitations, using risk governance from the Basel Principles and the NRB mandates should 
suffice to achieve the research project’s aim. 
5.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
This project has identified three broad areas for future research. First is to consider and apply 
other theoretical lenses for gaining profound knowledge on risk governance practices. Tricker 
(2019) views that there are numerous theoretical perspectives on corporate governance. In 
recent times, alternative theories on corporate governance, such as stewardship, resource 
dependency and stakeholder theory, have started becoming more prominent (Yusoff & Alhaji 
2012). In such a context, using contemporary theories will allow governance scholars to 
produce new and innovative interpretations of corporate governance phenomena (Zattoni & 
Van Ees 2012). Furthermore, scholars are encouraged to combine existing corporate 
governance theories (Borlea & Achim 2013; McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013; Yusoff & 
Alhaji 2012) to interpret governance phenomena (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013). From 
these arguments, it follows that using various theoretical frameworks would help governance 
scholars to explore governance phenomena from different perspectives. 
Second, qualitative risk governance scholars can embrace other rigorous research methods to 
collect and analyse data. McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) argue that using rigorous 
qualitative methods to explore governance phenomena can help governance scholars to 
consider a country’s specific legal and cultural foundations, which affect the governance issues 
of that particular nation. Thus, using rigorous qualitative methods helps in the exploration of a 
particular country’s governance phenomena. Within this context, qualitative scholars can 
employ research methods such as a focused group interview, either in isolation or in 
conjunction with other methods to collect data from broader ranges. For instance, the panel in 
a focused group could include experienced senior officials of the Rastra Bank and commercial 
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banks, as well as banking experts and policymakers. Conducting a focused group interview 
with these participants would allow an exploration of how the Basel’s Principles for the risk 
governance mechanism is helping the Nepalese banking industry to build a robust risk 
governance system. The focused group interview can also assist in gaining in-depth knowledge 
of how these officials interpret the Basel Principles to fit into in the Nepalese context. 
Third, future qualitative risk governance scholars could include other variables such as a bank’s 
risk culture, appetite, profile and strategy; MIS; remuneration of the CRO; and qualifications 
and experience of the audit and risk management committees to gain an in-depth knowledge of 
the risk governance system. Sheedy and Griffin (2018) argue that, in banks and financial 
institutions, risk culture and remuneration structures are crucial components that support risk 
management. Including these variables in future research might be deemed necessary because 
risk governance is just one dimension in risk management. Thus, in the above-discussed areas 
on risk governance, there is scope for future researchers who have an interest in undertaking a 
research project in Nepalese commercial banks. Incorporating these components in future 
governance research, therefore, will assist in a profound understanding of effective risk 
governance. 
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Appendix 1-1: Number of BFIs and Other Institutions as of Mid-July 2018 
Number of BFIs and Other Institutions as of Mid-July 2018 
Banks and Financial Institutions Number 
Commercial Banks (CBs) 28 
Development Banks (DBs) 33 
Finance Companies (FCs) 25 
Microfinance Financial Institutions (MFFIs) 65 
Sub-total 151 
NRB Licensed Cooperatives (Co-ops) 14 
NRB Licensed FINGOs (with limited banking activities) 24 
Insurance Companies (ICs) 38 
Reinsurance Company (RIC) 1 
Sub-total 77 
Securities Market Institutions  
Stock Exchange 1 
Central Depositary Company 1 
Stockbrokers 50 
Merchant Bankers 25 
Mutual Funds (MFs) 9 
Credit rating Agencies 2 
Depositary Participants* 70 
ASBA BFIs* 65 
Sub-total 88 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF) 1 
Citizen Investment Trust (CIT) 1 
Postal Saving Bank 1 
Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund  1 





* BFIs repeated as ASBA BFIs and Depository Participants not included in Total.  




Appendix 1-2: Minimum Regulatory Paid-Up Capital of BFIs as of 2018  
 
Minimum Regulatory Paid-Up Capital of BFIs as of 2018 (in NPR) 




4–10 Districts 1–3 Districts 
Commercial 
Bank 
8.00 billion    
Development 
Bank  
2.5 billion 1.2 billion 0.50 billion 
Finance 
Company 
800 million 800 million 400 million 
Microfinance 
Institution 
100 million 60 million 20 million 10 million 




Appendix 1-3: List of Commercial Banks in Nepal as on mid-July 2018 
No. Bank’s Name Date of Operation 
1 Nepal Bank Limited 1937/11/15 
2 Rastriya Banijya Bank Limited 1966/01/23 
3 Agricultural Development Bank Limited **  1968/01/21 
4 Nabil Bank Limited 1984/07/12 
5 Nepal Investment Bank Limited 1986/03/09 
6 Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Limited 1987/02/28 
7 Himalayan Bank Limited 1993/01/18 
8 Nepal SBI Bank Limited 1993/07/07 
9 Nepal Bangladesh Bank Limited 1994/06/06 
10 Everest Bank Limited 1994/10/18 
11 Kumari Bank Limited 2001/04/03 
12 Laxmi Bank Limited 2002/04/03 
13 Citizens Bank International Limited 2007/04/20 
14 Prime Commercial Bank Limited 2007/09/24 
15 Sunrise Bank Limited 2007/10/12 
16 Mega Bank Nepal Limited 2010/07/23 
17 Century Commercial Bank Limited 2011/03/10 
18 Sanima Bank Limited 2012/02/15 
19 Machhapuchhre Bank Limited 2012/07/09* 
20 NIC Asia Bank Limited 2013/06/30* 
21 Global IME Bank Limited 2014/04/09* 
22 NMB Bank Limited 2015/10/18* 
23 Prabhu Bank Limited 2016/02/12* 
24 Siddhartha Bank Limited 2016/07/21* 
25 Bank of Kathmandu Lumbini Limited 2016/07/14* 
26 Civil Bank Limited 2016/10/17* 
27 Nepal Credit and Commerce Bank Limited 2017/01/01* 
28 Janata Bank Nepal Limited 2017/04/07* 




** Started to operate as ‘A’ class Bank (from 2006/03) under BAFIA, 2006 





Appendix 2-1: Distinctive Differences between the Roles of an RMC and 
the Audit Committee 
Audit Committee RMC 
Focus 
Historical performance 
Effectiveness and efficiency of operations, 
reliability of financial reporting, and 
compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations 
Future performance 
Broader risks of strategic, managerial and 
operational levels 
Risks with financial and non-financial 
consequences 
Terms of Reference 
Audit 
Ensure that the company’s external and 
internal audits are sufficient to address 
business risks 
Risk Assessment 
Ensure that the company’s management 
regularly assess its risks and updates its risk 
register 
Ensure that risk assessment is part of the 
decision-making process, and that risks 
taken are within the risk appetite level set by 
the board  
Internal control 
Ensure that management has put in place 
appropriate internal controls to address 
business risks 




Ensure that management has put in place a 
risk management system to assess, control 
and monitor all risks 
Ensure the effective functioning and 





Review the company’s financial reports, 
in particular, ensuring that the duties of the 
directors on disclosure and representation 
of the company’s financial affairs are fully 
discharged  
Risk Reporting 
Review information and reports to the board 
on the company’s major risks and 
exposures, and their management 
 















Appendix 3-1: List of Risk Governance Variables to Investigate as per 
Basel Recommendations and Rastra Bank Requirements 
List of Risk Governance Variables to Investigate as per the Basel Recommendations 
and the Rastra Bank Requirements 
No. List of Items to Investigate As Per the 
Basel 
Accords 
As Per the 
NRB Act 
As Per the 
BAFIA 
1 Risk Governance at Board 
Level 
   
1.1  Audit Committee    
 Is the establishment of the Audit 
Committee mandated in for 
banks? 
Principle 3 Section 60  
 What Are the Audit Committee’s 
Mandates? 
Principle 3 Section 61  
1.2 RMC    
 Is the establishment of the RMC 
mandated for banks? 
Principle 3  ToR in Unified 
Directives 2075 
 What are the Risk Management 
Committee’s Mandates? 





Risk Governance at Senior 
Management Level 




 Is there an existence of separate 
risk management function 
mandated in banks? 
Principle 6  ToR in Unified 
Directives 2075 
 Is the appointment of the CRO 
compulsory in banks? 
Principle 6  ToR in Unified 
Directives 2075 
 Can the CRO have ‘dual hatting’? Principle 6  ToR in Unified 
Directives 2075 
 If the dual hatting of the CRO 
dual is legitimate, what are their 
functional titles? 
  ToR in Unified 
Directives 2075 
 What is the reporting line of the 
CRO, i.e., CEO or Board or Risk 
Committee? 
Principle 6  ToR in Unified 
Directives 2075 
 What is the reporting line of the 
CRO? 
Principle 6  ToR in Unified 
Directives 2075 
 What are the functions, duties and 
power of the CRO? 







Appendix 3-2: List of Risk Governance Variables to Investigate in the 
Sample Banks 
List of Risk Governance Variables to Investigate in the Sample Banks 
No. List of Items to Investigate As Per the NRB 
Act 
As Per the BAFIA 
1 Risk Governance at Board Level   
1.1  Audit Committee   
 Is there the existence of an Audit 




 What is the composition of the 
Audit Committee’s Mandates in 
the sample banks? 
Section 61  
 Does the CEO or Chairperson of 
another board sub-committee head 
the Audit Committee in the sample 
banks? 
Section 61  
 What is the reporting line of the 
Audit Committee? 
Section 61  
 How many times has the Audit 
Committee’s meeting been 
conducted? 
Section 61  
 Have all sample banks disclosed 
the duration of each audit 
committee’s meeting? 




 Have all sample banks fulfilled the 
mandate given to the committee? 
  
 What are the functions, duties 
and powers of the Audit 
Committee/Purpose of Audit 
Committee? 
Section 61  
 How similarly or differently does 
the bank’s audit committee 
function against the NRB 
requirements? 
  
1.2 Risk Management Committee   
 Is there the existence of a Risk 
Management Committee in all 
sample banks? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 What is the composition of the 
RMC in the sample banks? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 What is the reporting line of the 
RMC? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 How many times has the RMC 
meeting been conducted? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 Have all sample banks disclosed 
the duration of each risk 
committee’s meeting? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 Have all sample banks fulfilled the 
mandate given to the committee? 
  
 What are the functions, duties and 
powers of the RMC? 






2 Risk Governance at Senior 
Management Level 
  
 Is there the existence of a separate 
risk management function in all the 
sample banks? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 Is the CRO appointed in every 
sample bank? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 Does the CRO have ‘dual hatting’ 
in the sample banks? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 If the CRO has dual hatting, what 
are their functional titles? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 What is the reporting line of the 
CRO, i.e., CEO or Board or Risk 
Committee? 
 ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 
 Do all sample banks have the same 
reporting line? 
  
 What are the functions, duties and 
power of the CRO? 






Appendix 4-1: Mandates of the Audit Committee as per the Basel and NRB 
As Per Principle 3 (Bank for 
International Settlements 2015) 
On Page 16 
As Per Section 60 under Bank and Financial 
Institutions Act 2073 (2017) 
On Pages 62, 63 
Systemically important banks are 
strongly recommended for other 
banks based on an organisation’s 
size, risk profile or complexity to 
establish an Audit Committee; 
The Board of Directors of a bank or financial 
institution shall have to form an Audit Committee. 
Audit Committee is made up entirely 
of independent or non-executive 
board members. 
Audit Committee should comprise of three 
members under the headship of one non-executive 
Director. 
Audit Committee has a chair who is 
independent and is not the chair of 
the board or any other committee; 
 
The Chairperson of the bank or financial 
institution, convener of the sub-committees and the 
Chief Executive, shall not be allowed to act in the 
audit committee referred to in Sub-Section (1). 
 
Members of the committee referred to in Sub-
Section (1) shall not be entitled to be engaged in 
collecting deposits, disbursing credits, investing in 
securities, and making decisions in any daily 
transaction that requires for making expenses out of 





Except in cases of the meeting called by the Board 
of Directors, meeting of the Audit Committee 
generally shall be held once every three months. 
  Procedures of the meeting of the Audit Committee 
shall be as prescribed the committee itself. 
Audit Committee should include 
members who have experience in 
audit practices, financial reporting, 
and accounting. 
  
Audit Committee should be distinct 







Appendix 4-2: Major Responsibilities and Function of the Audit 
Committee as per the Basel and NRB 
As per Principle 3 (Bank for International 
Settlements 2015) 
On Pages 16, 17 
As Per Section 61 of BAFIA 2073 (2017) 
On Page 63 
Framing policy on internal audit and 
financial reporting, among other things; 
  
  
Overseeing the financial reporting process; To ascertain whether or not the accounts, 
budget and internal auditing procedures, the 
internal control mechanism of bank and 
financial institution are appropriate and if 
they are appropriate, to carry out 
monitoring and supervision, whether or not 
they are complied with, 
Providing oversight of and interacting with 
the bank’s internal and external auditors; 
  
  To cause to carry out internal auditing of 
the accounts and books of records of the 
bank or financial institution and to ascertain 
that whether or not such documents are 
prepared according to the prevailing law, 





  To conduct or to cause to conduct auditing 
of management and operation, managerial 
and work performance of the bank or 
financial institution to be assured that the 
laws in force in the bank or financial 
institution are fully complied with. 
Receiving key audit reports and ensuring that 
senior management is taking necessary 
corrective actions promptly to address 
control weaknesses, non-compliance with 
policies, laws, and regulations, and other 
problems identified by auditors and other 
control functions 
To carry out monitoring whether or not 
actions are being taken according to the Act 
or Rules enacted under the Act, Bylaws, 
policies or given directives in the bank or 
financial institution and to submit a report 
thereof to the Board of Directors, 
Approving, or recommending to the board or 
shareholders for their approval, the 
appointment, remuneration, and dismissal of 
external auditors 
To recommend names of three auditors for 
the appointment of the external auditor, 
  To furnish opinion on the subjects as 
required by the Board of Directors. 
Reviewing and approving the audit scope and 
frequency 
  
Overseeing the establishment of accounting 





Reviewing the third-party opinions on the 
design and effectiveness of the overall risk 
governance framework and internal control 
system 
  





Appendix 4-3: Mandates of the Risk Management Committee as per the 
Basel and the NRB 
As per Principle 3 (Bank for International 
Settlements 2015) 
On Page 16 
As Per ToR in Unified Directives 
2075 under Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 
2002 
The risk management committee is required for 
systemically important banks and is strongly 
recommended for other banks based on a bank's 
size, risk profile or complexity; 
The Board of Directors shall have to 
form a Risk Management Committee. 
Risk management committee should be distinct 
from the audit committee, but may have other 
related tasks, such as finance; 
  
Risk management committee should have a chair 
who is an independent director and not the chair of 
the board or any other committee; 
The Board of Directors shall have to 
form a Risk Management Committee 
led by a non-executive director. 
Risk management committee should include a 
majority of independent members; 
  
Risk management committee should include 
members who have experience in risk management 





The risk management committee is required to 
review the bank's risk policies at least annually; 
  
Risk management committee should be effective 
communication and coordination between the audit 
committee and the risk committee to facilitate the 
exchange of information and effective coverage of 
all risks, including emerging risks, and any needed 
adjustments to the risk governance framework of 
the bank; 
  
Risk management committee should receive 
regular reporting and communication from the 
CRO and other relevant functions about the bank's 
current risk profile, the current state of the risk 
culture, utilisation against the established risk 
appetite, and limits, limit breaches, and mitigation 
plans. 
To regularly receive risk reports from 
the management, to discuss on how 
the risks are being estimated, 
evaluated, controlled and monitored; 
and to impart needful suggestions to 
the Board of Directors in this 
connection. 
  The Head of Operations Department 
shall be its member whereas the Head 
of Credit Department or a Head of a 
separate unit looking after risk 
management, if any, shall be its 
member secretary. 
  The meeting of Committee shall seat 





Appendix 4-4: Major Responsibilities and Major Decisions to be 
Undertaken by the Risk Management Committee as per the Basel and NRB 
As Per Principle 3 (Bank for 
International Settlements 2015) 
On Page 17 
As Per ToR in Unified Directives 2075 
under Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002 
Risk management committee should 
discuss all risk strategies on both an 
aggregated basis and by type of risk and 
make recommendations to the board 
thereon, and on the risk appetite. 
 
  
Risk management committee should 
oversee that management has in place 
processes to promote the bank’s 
adherence to the approved risk policies. 
  
Risk management committee’s work 
includes oversight of the strategies for 
capital and liquidity management as well 
as for all relevant risks of the bank, such 
as credit, market, operational and 
reputational risks, to ensure they are 





The risk management committee of the 
board is responsible for advising the 
board on the bank's overall current and 
future risk appetite, overseeing senior 
management's implementation of the 
RAS, reporting on the state of risk culture 
in the bank, and interacting with and 
overseeing the CRO. 
To regularly review the level of risks inherent 
in business activities, risk tolerance capacity, 
strategies developed for risk management, 
policy provisions, and guidelines; and to 
suggest the Board of Directors on their 
sufficiency. 
  To impart suggestions to the Board of 
Directors as regards developing needful 
policies and framework as per the 
directives/guidelines issued by the Nepal 
Rastra Bank, the internal limits fixed by the 
institution and suitable practices for risk 
management. 
  To conduct stress testing regularly in the 'A' 
level commercial banks, to discuss their 
outcomes, and to impart suggestions to the 
Board of Directors on the needful policy 
framing or decision-making for the future, on 
these bases. 
  To review the rationale and limits of power 
delegation made by the Board of Directors, 





  To conduct a review, every 3 months, on the 
assets structure of institution, mobilisation 
status of those assets, income that may be 
derived from those assets, increase or 
depreciation of quality of assets, and the 
functions of Assets and Liability Committee, 
and to submit a report to the Board of 
Directors, in this regard. 
  To commission a study on the impact that may 
befall on the financial status of the institution 
due problems or changes that may pop up in a 
sector of the economy, and submit a report at 
the Board of Directors inclusive of the needful 
suggestions on what policies should be 






Appendix 4-5: Mandates of the Risk Management Function and the CRO 
as per the Basel and the NRB 
As Per Principle 6 (Bank for International 
Settlements 2015) 
On Pages 25, 26 
As Per ToR in Unified Directives 2075 
under Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002. 
Banks should have an effective independent 
risk management function, under the direction 
of a CRO. 
Independent risk management function 
should be headed under a CRO of the 
institution or an official of similar 
designation. 
Have sufficient stature, independence, 
resources, and access to the board. 
The CRO is required to directly report 
before the Risk Management Committee 
on par with Board of Directors in a 
periodic manner. 
The board or its risk committee should 
approve appointment, dismissal and other 
changes to the CRO position. 
  
If the CRO is removed from his or her 
position, this should be disclosed publicly. 
  
The bank should also discuss the reasons for 
such removal with its supervisor. 
  
The CRO’s performance, compensation, and 
budget should be reviewed and approved by 





The CRO should be independent and have 
duties distinct from other executive functions. 
  
The CRO should not be involved in revenue 
generation, held line responsibility or 
participated in business decision-making or 
the approval process.  
  
There should be no ‘dual hatting’; however, if 
‘dual hatting’ is inevitable, these roles should 
be compatible 
The business functions and risk 
management functions should be so 
demarcated that there exists no conflict of 





Appendix 4-6: The NRB’s Mandates for Audit Committee Observed in the 
Sample Banks 
Presence of the Audit Committee in the Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2016/2017 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2017/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total number of members, including coordinator of audit committee of sample banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 No information provided 3 4 5 
2016/2017 No information provided 4  4  5 
2017/2018 3  3  4 5 
Reporting Line and Independence of the Audit Committee in the Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 





















Number of the Audit Committee Meeting Conducted by Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 No information 
provided 
5 15/16 5/9/8 
2016/2017 No information 
provided 
4 13 Stated meets the 
regulatory 
requirements 






Appendix 4-7: The NRB’s Mandates for RMC Observed in the Sample 
Banks 
Presence of Risk Management Committee in the Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2016/2017 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2017/2018 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total Number of Members in Risk Management Committee  
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 No information provided 3 4 6 
2016/2017 No information provided 3 4  5 
2017/2018 5 3 4 5 
Reporting Line of Risk Management Committee in the Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 





















Number of the RMC Meeting Conducted by the Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 No information provided 3 5 3 
2016/2017 No information provided 4 6 Stated meets the 
regulatory 
requirements 







Appendix 4-8: The NRB’s Mandates for Senior Management Observed in 
the Sample Banks 
Existence of Risk Management Function/Department 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 










2017/2018 Yes No information 
provided 
Yes Yes 
Existence of CRO as Head of Risk Management Unit 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 No information 
provided 







2016/2017 No information 
provided 














Reporting Line of the Chief Risk Officer 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 



























Dual Hatting of the CRO in the Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 No information 
provided 
Yes No No information 
provided 
2016/2017 No information 
provided 
Yes No Yes 
2017/2018 No  Yes Yes Yes 
Other Roles of Chief Risk Officer in the Sample Banks 
Year EBL SCB CTZN SRBL 
2015/2016 No information 
provided 
CRO & Senior 
Credit Officer 





2016/2017 No information 
provided 
CRO & Senior 
Credit Officer 




2017/2018 No  CRO & Senior 
Credit Officer 
Chief Risk and 
Recovery 
Officer (CRRO) 







Appendix 4-9: Methods for Calculating Capital According to Basel II 
Method for Calculating Capital According to Basel II 
 Credit Risk Market Risk Operational Risk 
Approaches  
(from least  











5. Internal Models 
Approach 







Result Risk-weighted asset 
value for credit risk 




Source: Apostolik and Donohue (2015, p. 248) 
 
